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Dynamic Incentives in Sales Force Compensation

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Rubel

    (University of California, Davis, Davis, California 95616)

  • Ashutosh Prasad

    (University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080)

Abstract

To inform the design of sales force compensation plans when carryover effects exist, we propose a dynamic model where these effects, together with present selling efforts, drive sales. Our results show that a salesperson with low risk aversion exerts effort to decrease attrition from existing business, whereas a salesperson with high risk aversion does not. Why? Because carryover increases not only expected sales but also sales uncertainty. Consequently, the manager should incentivize the high risk-aversion salesperson with a concave compensation plan to counterbalance suboptimal customer attrition, and the low risk-aversion salesperson with a convex compensation plan that limits coasting on past efforts. We generalize our results to when the firm employs multiple salespeople, and when advertising and personal selling are budgeted together.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Rubel & Ashutosh Prasad, 2016. "Dynamic Incentives in Sales Force Compensation," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(4), pages 676-689, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:35:y:2016:i:4:p:676-689
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.2015.0953
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tinglong Dai & Kinshuk Jerath, 2019. "Salesforce Contracting Under Uncertain Demand and Supply: Double Moral Hazard and Optimality of Smooth Contracts," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(5), pages 852-870, September.
    2. Valerie Good & Douglas E. Hughes & Ahmet H. Kirca & Sean McGrath, 2022. "A self-determination theory-based meta-analysis on the differential effects of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on salesperson performance," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 586-614, May.
    3. Dexiang Yang & Lei Zhang & Ying Wu & Sidai Guo & Hua Zhang & Lijian Xiao, 2018. "A Sustainability Analysis on Retailer’s Sales Effort in A Closed-Loop Supply Chain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-20, December.
    4. Valerie Good & Douglas E. Hughes & Hao Wang, 2022. "More than money: establishing the importance of a sense of purpose for salespeople," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 272-295, March.
    5. Jian Chen & He Huang & Liming Liu & Hongyan Xu, 2021. "Price Delegation or Not? The Effect of Heterogeneous Sales Agents," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(5), pages 1350-1364, May.
    6. Yang, Xiaolin & Gou, Qinglong & Wang, Xin & Zhang, Juzhi, 2022. "Does bonus motivate streamers to perform better? An analysis of compensation mechanisms for live streaming platforms," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    7. Wang, Charles X. & Qian, Zhuang & Zhao, Yabing, 2018. "Impact of manufacturer and retailer's market pricing power on customer satisfaction incentives in supply chains," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 98-112.

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