Research Note---Information Technology, Contract Completeness, and Buyer-Supplier Relationships
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DOI: 10.1287/isre.1060.0083
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- McCullough, Jeffrey S. & Snir, Eli M., 2010. "Monitoring technology and firm boundaries: Physician-hospital integration and technology utilization," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 457-467, May.
- Shantanu Bhattacharya & Alok Gupta & Sameer Hasija, 2014. "Joint Product Improvement by Client and Customer Support Center: The Role of Gain-Share Contracts in Coordination," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(1), pages 137-151, March.
- Kunsoo Han & Robert J. Kauffman & Barrie R. Nault, 2011. "Research Note ---Returns to Information Technology Outsourcing," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 22(4), pages 824-840, December.
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Keywords
contract theory; transaction cost; interorganizational systems; business-to-business relationships;All these keywords.
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