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A Practical Combinatorial Clock Exchange for Spectrum Licenses

Author

Listed:
  • Karla Hoffman

    (Department of Systems Engineering and Operations Research, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia 22030)

  • Dinesh Menon

    (Decisive Analytics Corporation, Arlington, Virginia 22202)

Abstract

A centralized combinatorial exchange has been considered as a means to enable efficient restructuring of spectrum holdings by allowing traders to buy and sell spectrum resources. We propose a new, two-sided, multiple-round, combinatorial clock exchange mechanism that enables traders to specify reserve prices and submit consolidated bundle orders on spectrum assets to be bought and sold. Any trader may submit multiple orders over several rounds. A trading agent's order can only be executed when it matches with bids and asks from one or more other agents. Acceptable bid and ask prices are adjusted each round to decrease the spread, and the final, market-clearing trades are executed to maximize the gains from trade. This paper outlines the clock mechanism and presents a new approach for allocation of surplus among the market-clearing agents to maximize incentives for participation.

Suggested Citation

  • Karla Hoffman & Dinesh Menon, 2010. "A Practical Combinatorial Clock Exchange for Spectrum Licenses," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 58-77, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:7:y:2010:i:1:p:58-77
    DOI: 10.1287/deca.1090.0169
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. L. Robin Keller, 2011. "From the Editor ---Multiattribute and Intertemporal Preferences, Probability, and Stochastic Processes: Models and Assessment," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 8(3), pages 165-169, September.
    3. Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene) & Lee, Joosung, 2024. "The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 191-203.
    4. Chen, Haoxun, 2016. "Combinatorial clock-proxy exchange for carrier collaboration in less than truck load transportation," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 152-172.
    5. Robert F. Bordley & Elena Katok & L. Robin Keller, 2010. "Honoring Michael H. Rothkopf's Legacy of Rigor and Relevance in Auction Theory: From the Editors," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 1-4, March.

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