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Jumping The Curse: Early Contracting With Private Information In University Admissions

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  • Sam-Ho Lee

Abstract

This article introduces a new model of early contracting. Employers who have private information about the applicant's ability worry that applicants who accept their offer are precisely those who were not offered other jobs. To avoid this winner's curse, employers anticipate the time of contracting. The model is developed in the context of university admissions, and is shown to be consistent with several stylized facts in that "market." We show that, in contrast to received wisdom, allocative efficiency may be improved by the presence of early contracting. Copyright © (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Sam-Ho Lee, 2009. "Jumping The Curse: Early Contracting With Private Information In University Admissions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(1), pages 1-38, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:50:y:2009:i:1:p:1-38
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Wei-Cheng & Kao, Yi-Cheng, 2014. "Simultaneous screening and college admissions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 296-298.
    2. Nei, Stephen & Pakzad-Hurson, Bobak, 2021. "Strategic disaggregation in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    3. Changhui Kang & Sam-Ho Lee, 2015. "Being Knowledgeable or Sociable? Different Patterns of Human Capital Development and Evaluation in Cognitive and Non-cognitive Skills," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 31, pages 57-87.
    4. Chen, Wei-Cheng & Chen, Yi-Yi & Kao, Yi-Cheng, 2018. "Limited choice in college admissions: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 295-316.
    5. Siqi Pan, 2018. "Exploding offers and unraveling in two-sided matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 351-373, March.
    6. Van Kolpin & Mark Stater, 2013. "The Real Deal? Information Asymmetries and Tuition Discounting in Higher Education," Review of Economic Analysis, Digital Initiatives at the University of Waterloo Library, vol. 5(2), pages 190-212, December.
    7. James A. Dearden & Suhui Li & Chad D. Meyerhoefer & Muzhe Yang, 2017. "Demonstrated Interest: Signaling Behavior In College Admissions," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(4), pages 630-657, October.
    8. Kolpin, Van & Stater, Mark, 2024. "The perverse equilibrium effects of state and federal student aid in higher education," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 679-691.
    9. Christopher Avery & Jonathan Levin, 2010. "Early Admissions at Selective Colleges," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2125-2156, December.
    10. Chapman, Gabrielle & Dickert-Conlin, Stacy, 2012. "Applying early decision: Student and college incentives and outcomes," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 749-763.
    11. Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2021. "Strategic Issues in College Admissions with Early Decision," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(1), pages 66-84.
    12. Kloosterman, Andrew & Troyan, Peter, 2020. "School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    13. Zeky Murra-Anton, 2022. "Financial aid and early admissions at selective need-blind colleges," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(3), pages 833-870, October.
    14. Yeon-Koo Che & Youngwoo Koh, 2016. "Decentralized College Admissions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1295-1338.
    15. , C. & ,, 2013. "Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.

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