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Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good

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  • Gradstein, Mark

Abstract

A discrete public good is characterized by a threshold production function: the good is provided if a certain number of contributors is reached. The author considers a Bayesian framework where an individual's cost associated with his participation in the provision of a public good is private information. An efficient allocation mechanism is constructed when the outside option--available to individuals refusing to participate in the mechanism--is zero utility and also for uniform uncertainty when the outside option is either voluntary contribution or forced contribution. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Gradstein, Mark, 1994. "Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 877-897, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:35:y:1994:i:4:p:877-97
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    Cited by:

    1. Katsuya Kobayashi, 2019. "Step-by-step group contests with group-specific public-good prizes," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 183-204, June.
    2. Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris, 2008. "An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 67-76, January.
    3. Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2010. "NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(2), pages 114-132, April.
    4. Denis Lescop, 2007. "Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(4), pages 273-284, March.
    5. Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura & Seo, Tae Kun, 2003. "Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 205-227, April.
    6. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2016. "Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2016-101, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo K. & Temimi, Akram, 2001. "Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 493-514, July.
    8. Jingfeng Lu & Euston Quah, 2009. "Private Provisions of a Discrete Public Good with Voluntary Participation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 343-362, June.
    9. BELLEFLAMME, Paul & LAMBERT, Thomas & SCHWIENBACHER, Armin, 2011. "Crowdfunding: tapping the right crowd," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2011032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    10. Gang, Ira & Epstein, Gil S, 2002. "Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making," CEPR Discussion Papers 3585, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Rosenthal, Edward C., 1998. "Information and strategyproofness in joint project selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 207-221, May.
    12. Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Auction-Like Mechanisms for Pricing Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 340-368, October.
    13. Byungchae Rhee, 2008. "A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 619-653, May.
    14. Byungchae Rhee, 2004. "A Characterization of Optimal Feasible Tax Mechanism," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 551, Econometric Society.
    15. Shingo Yamazaki, 2019. "Private provision of discrete public goods: the correlated cost case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(3), pages 477-496, March.
    16. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2006. "Contests, NGOs, and Decentralizing Aid," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 285-296, May.
    17. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2019. "Taxation and social protection under governance decentralisation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    18. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2016. "Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization," WIDER Working Paper Series 101, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    19. Gradstein, Mark, 1998. "Provision of public goods in a large economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 229-234, November.
    20. Magee, Stephen & Lee, Hak Loh & Lee, Hongshik, 2017. "Simple measures of endogenous free-riding in protectionist lobbies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 324-333.
    21. Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 123-138, March.

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