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Cyclical and Noncyclical Redistributive Taxation

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  • Kemp, Murray C
  • Long, Ngo Van
  • Shimomura, Koji

Abstract

Consider the optimal time path of a tax on capital income, the proceeds of which are transferred to labor in a lump sum. It is known from earlier open-loop formulations that, if the optimal rate of tax converges to a point, it converges to zero, implying that, in the long run, a tax on capital income can do nothing for social welfare. It is now shown that the optimal rate of tax need not converge to zero and, in the case of feedback formulations, that it may converge to a positive or negative number or to a limit cycle. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Kemp, Murray C & Long, Ngo Van & Shimomura, Koji, 1993. "Cyclical and Noncyclical Redistributive Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(2), pages 415-429, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:34:y:1993:i:2:p:415-29
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    Cited by:

    1. Selim, Sheikh, 2006. "On Policy Relevance of Ramsey Tax Rules," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2006/19, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section, revised Jul 2006.
    2. Leslie J. Reinhorn, 2019. "On optimal redistributive capital taxation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(3), pages 460-487, June.
    3. Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Long, 2011. "Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 479-497, December.
    4. Dalgic, Engin & Long, Ngo Van, 2006. "Corrupt local governments as resource farmers: The helping hand and the grabbing hand," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 115-138, March.
    5. Günther Rehme, 2023. "Investment subsidies and redistributive capital income taxation in a neoclassical growth model," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 988-1012, October.
    6. Benhabib, Jess & Rustichini, Aldo, 1997. "Optimal Taxes without Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 231-259, December.
    7. Krusell, Per, 2002. "Time-consistent redistribution," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 755-769, May.
    8. Günther Rehme, 2023. "Capital depreciation allowances, redistributive taxation, and economic growth," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 168-195, February.
    9. Salo, Seppo & Tahvonen, Olli, 2001. "Oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 671-702, May.
    10. Holger Strulik, 2007. "A distributional theory of government growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 305-318, September.
    11. João Faria & Rajeev Goel, 2010. "Returns to networking in academia," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 103-117, July.
    12. Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura, 2000. "Semi-Stationary Equilibrium in Leader-Follower Games," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-08, CIRANO.
    13. Guo, Jang-Ting & Lansing, Kevin J., 1999. "Optimal taxation of capital income with imperfectly competitive product markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(7), pages 967-995, June.
    14. Murray C. Kemp & Ngo Van Long, 2007. "Development Aid in the Presence of Corruption: Differential Games among Donors," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-23, CIRANO.
    15. Patrick A. Pintus, 2008. "Laffer traps and monetary policy," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 90(May), pages 165-174.
    16. Ludwig Straub & Iván Werning, 2020. "Positive Long-Run Capital Taxation: Chamley-Judd Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(1), pages 86-119, January.
    17. Guo, Jang-Ting & Lansing, Kevin J., 2002. "Fiscal Policy, Increasing Returns, And Endogenous Fluctuations," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(5), pages 633-664, November.
    18. Mino, Kazuo, 2001. "Optimal taxation in dynamic economies with increasing returns," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 235-253, August.
    19. Mino, Kazuo, 2001. "On Time Consistency in Stackelberg Differential Games," MPRA Paper 17028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Berthod, Mathias & Benchekroun, Hassan, 2019. "On agreements in a nonrenewable resource market: A cooperative differential game approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 23-39.
    21. Halkos, George, 2008. "A Stackelberg Model on Taxing Polluting Firms," MPRA Paper 23741, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. George E. Halkos & George J. Papageorgiou, 2012. "Pollution Control Policy: A Dynamic Taxation Scheme," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 14-37, March.
    23. Nicolas Dromel & Patrick-Antoine Pintus, 2006. "Are Progressive Fiscal Rules Stabilizing?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00410452, HAL.
    24. Engelbert Dockner & Gustav Feichtinger, 1991. "On the optimality of limit cycles in dynamic economic systems," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 31-50, February.
    25. repec:bla:reviec:v:17:y:2009:i:si:p:230-243 is not listed on IDEAS

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