Corrupt local governments as resource farmers: The helping hand and the grabbing hand
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- Engin Dalgic & Ngo Van Long, 2004. "Corrupt Local Government as Resource Farmers: The Helping Hand and the Grabbing Hand," CESifo Working Paper Series 1248, CESifo.
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Cited by:
- Gulnaz Sharafutdinova & Jevgenijs Steinbuks, 2017. "Governors matter," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 25(3), pages 471-493, July.
- Vincent Bignon & Rui Esteves & Alfonso Herranz-Loncán, 2015.
"Big push or big grab? Railways, government activism, and export growth in Latin America, 1865–1913,"
Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 68(4), pages 1277-1305, November.
- Bignon, V. & Esteves, R. & Herranz-Loncán, A., 2013. "Big Push or Big Grab? Railways, Government Activism and Export Growth in Latin America, 1865-1913," Working papers 447, Banque de France.
- Vincent Bignon & Rui Esteves & Alfonso Herranz-Loncán, 2013. "Big push or big grab? Railways, government activism and export growth in Latin America, 1865-1913," Working Papers 13021, Economic History Society.
- Vincent Bignon & Rui Esteves & Alfonso Herranz Loncan, 2015. "Big Push or Big Grab? Railways, Government Activism and Export Growth In Latin America, 1865-1913," Post-Print hal-01410632, HAL.
- Thomas Aronsson & David Granlund, 2017. "Federal subsidization of state expenditure to reduce political budget cycles," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(3), pages 536-545, June.
- Ngo Van Long & Bodhisattva Sengupta, 2008. "Yardstick Competition, Corruption, and Electoral Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2345, CESifo.
- Anton Granik & Francesco Saraceno, 2012. "Institutions and growth: A simplied theory of decentralization and corruption," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2012-21, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
- repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9k2cag6dp8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nobuhiro Mizuno & Katsuyuki Naito & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2017.
"Inequality, extractive institutions, and growth in nondemocratic regimes,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 115-142, January.
- Mizuno, Nobuhiro & Naito, Katsuyuki & Okazawa, Ryosuke, 2012. "Inequality, extractive institutions, and growth in nondemocratic regimes," MPRA Paper 41434, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9k2cag6dp8 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:elg:eechap:15325_22 is not listed on IDEAS
- Anton Granik & Francesco Saraceno, 2012. "Institutions and growth : a simplified theory of decentralization and corruption," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03461200, HAL.
- Anton Granik & Francesco Saraceno, 2012. "Institutions and growth : a simplified theory of decentralization and corruption," Working Papers hal-03461200, HAL.
- Frye, Timothy M. & Iwasaki, Ichiro, 2011. "Government directors and business–state relations in Russia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 642-658.
- Alexander Libman, 2012. "Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 1321-1352, December.
- repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9k2cag6dp8 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3kup1vc9k2cag6dp8 is not listed on IDEAS
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