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Ciclo Político Presupuestario en Chile: Un estudio exploratorio para las elecciones de alcalde 2012

Author

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  • Cristian Guzmán Cofré

    (Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas, Departamento de Economía (Chile))

  • Fabián Luengo Fernández

    (Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción (Chile))

  • Paula Rojas Espinoza

    (Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción (Chile))

Abstract

La presente investigación tiene como objetivo explorar la existencia de ciclos políticos presupuestarios a escala municipal en Chile. Tal como se ha planteado en la literatura, la existencia de ciclo político presupuestario incentiva/motiva a un político en ejercicio a modificar la estructura de gasto con el objetivo de obtener la reelección en el cargo. Para el caso de las elecciones de alcalde de Chile del año 2012, realizamos una estimación cross-section y los resultados evidencian una relación positivo del gasto municipal de los 2 años previo a la elección sobre con la votación que recibe un incumbente. Además, la votación previa del incumbente y la pertenencia a una coalición política inciden en el porcentaje de votos recibidos./ The objective of this research is to explore the existence of budgetary political cycles at municipal level in Chile. As stated in the literature, the existence of budgetary policy cycle encourages / motivates a politician in exercise to modify the structure of expenditure with the objective of obtaining re-election in office. In the case of the elections of mayor of Chile in 2012, we made a cross-section estimation and the results show a positive relationship of the municipal spending of the 2 years prior to the election over the vote received by an incumbent. In addition, the previous vote of the incumbent and the membership of a political coalition affect the percentage of votes received.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristian Guzmán Cofré & Fabián Luengo Fernández & Paula Rojas Espinoza, 2017. "Ciclo Político Presupuestario en Chile: Un estudio exploratorio para las elecciones de alcalde 2012," Revista Actualidad Económica, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas, vol. 27(93), pages 15-24, Sept-Dic.
    • Handle: RePEc:ief:revaec:v:27:y:2017:i:93:p:15-24
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Eslava, Marcela, 2006. "Ciclos políticos de la política fiscal con votantes opuestos al déficit. El caso colombiano," El Trimestre Económico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, vol. 0(290), pages 289-336, abril-jun.
    4. Balaguer-Coll, María Teresa & Brun-Martos, María Isabel, 2013. "El efecto del gasto público sobre las posibilidades de reelección de los gobiernos locales," Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 74-80.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ciclo político presupuestario; economía política; elecciones municipales;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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