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Ciclos políticos de la política fiscal con votantes opuestos al déficit. El caso colombiano

Author

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  • Eslava, Marcela

    (Universidad de los Andes)

Abstract

Theoretical models of the political budget cycle suggest that electoral manipulation of government expenditures can take the form of changes in the composition of spending, without impacting the overall budget or the deficit, and that the form and extent of this manipulation depend on the fiscal preferences of voters. These insights, however, are often overlooked in empirical studies. In this paper, I use data on government expenditures and election outcomes in Colombia to provide an integrated analysis of voting behavior and the pre-electoral dynamics of government spending. I emphasize potential changes in the composition, rather than the size, of the budget. I find that components of the budget that can be identified with targeted spending grow, and that non-targeted spending contracts, in the year preceding an election. Consistently, I find that voters reward the preelection increases in targeted spending, but punish incumbents who run high deficits before the election.// Según algunos modelos teóricos, la manipulación electoral del gasto público puede tomar la forma de cambios en la composición del mismo, posiblemente sin afectar el déficit. La teoría también señala que la magnitud de cambios electorales en el gasto depende de las preferencias fiscales de los votantes. Este trabajo utiliza datos de gasto público y resultados electorales en municipios colombianos en un análisis integrado del comportamiento de los votantes y la dinámica del gasto público en periodos electorales. El hincapié es en la composición del presupuesto más que en su tamaño. Se encuentra que antes de elecciones los componentes del presupuesto que son más visibles y favorecidos por los votantes aumentan, mientras otros tipos de gasto caen. De manera congruente las perspectivas electorales futuras del partido en el poder son favorecidas por incrementos electorales del gasto “preferido”, mientras que incrementos electorales del déficit tienen el efecto contrario.

Suggested Citation

  • Eslava, Marcela, 2006. "Ciclos políticos de la política fiscal con votantes opuestos al déficit. El caso colombiano," El Trimestre Económico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, vol. 0(290), pages 289-336, abril-jun.
  • Handle: RePEc:elt:journl:v:73:y:2006:i:290:p:289-336
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20430/ete.v73i290.546
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Drazen, Allan & Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 39-52, May.
    2. Marcela Eslava, 2006. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: Survey," Research Department Publications 4487, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    3. Rafael Santos, 2007. "Bogotá: the collapse of a political machine," Documentos CEDE 4011, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    4. Clark Granger-Castaño & Yurany Hernández-Turca & Carlos Murcia-Bustos & Lisseth Yaya-Garzón, 2018. "Ciclo político en las finanzas de los gobiernos regionales de Colombia 1998-2014," Borradores de Economia 1044, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    5. Cristian Guzmán Cofré & Fabián Luengo Fernández & Paula Rojas Espinoza, 2017. "Ciclo Político Presupuestario en Chile: Un estudio exploratorio para las elecciones de alcalde 2012," Revista Actualidad Económica, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas, vol. 27(93), pages 15-24, Sept-Dic.
    6. Alberto Alesina & Matteo Paradisi, 2017. "Political budget cycles: Evidence from Italian cities," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 157-177, July.
    7. Rafael José Santos Villagran, 2007. "Bogotá, El Colapso de una Maquinaria Política," Economic Analysis Working Papers (2002-2010). Atlantic Review of Economics (2011-2016), Colexio de Economistas de A Coruña, Spain and Fundación Una Galicia Moderna, vol. 6, pages 1-28, December.
    8. Burret, Heiko T. & Feld, Lars P., 2018. "(Un-)intended effects of fiscal rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 166-191.
    9. Galindo-Silva, Hector, 2015. "New parties and policy outcomes: Evidence from Colombian local governments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 86-103.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ciclos políticos del presupuesto; elecciones; Colombia; gastos y presupuestos municipales;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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