IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ibn/masjnl/v8y2013i1p147.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Comparison of Different Auction Pricing Rules in the Electricity Market

Author

Listed:
  • Ly Fie Sugianto
  • Kevin Liao

Abstract

The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of different auction pricing rules on the market performance in the context of the competitive electricity market. In pursuing this objective, a simplified model of auction based electricity market has been designed and three distinctive pricing rules are analyzed- uniform pricing, pay-as-bid pricing and the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove pricing. Using agent-based modeling approach, generators have been modelled as agents submitting price-quantity bids to the market. The Simulated-Annealing Q-learning algorithm has been adopted as the learning mechanism for the agents so they can maximize their profit using strategic bidding. The computer simulation is used to test the effect of the different pricing rules on the total dispatch cost, bid price and generators’ profit. In addition, the generating capacity of one of the competing agents is altered to a significantly larger size to evaluate the effect of the relative market share on total dispatch cost and agents’ welfare. This study concludes that the pay-as-bid auction can complicate the way bidders learn and react about each other’s strategy. While uniform pricing results in high and volatile total dispatch cost in the market and pay-as-bid pricing induces truthful bidding leading to low dispatch cost, Vickrey pricing seems to provide a good balance between controlling the total cost and its stability. The theoretical and practical contributions of this study are also discussed in the paper.

Suggested Citation

  • Ly Fie Sugianto & Kevin Liao, 2013. "Comparison of Different Auction Pricing Rules in the Electricity Market," Modern Applied Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 8(1), pages 147-147, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibn:masjnl:v:8:y:2013:i:1:p:147
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/mas/article/download/32644/19410
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/mas/article/view/32644
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing electricity auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, March.
    2. Vázquez, Carlos & Rivier, Michel & Pérez-Arriaga, Ignacio J., 2001. "If Pay-as-Bid Auctions Are Not a Solution for California, then Why Not a Reliability Market?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 41-48, May.
    3. Fabra, Natalia & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik & Harbord, David, 2002. "Modeling Electricity Auctions," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(7), pages 72-81.
    4. Derek Bunn & Fernando Oliveira, 2003. "Evaluating Individual Market Power in Electricity Markets via Agent-Based Simulation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 57-77, July.
    5. Axelrod, Robert, 1981. "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 306-318, June.
    6. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    7. Derek W. Bunn and Fernando Oliveira, 2001. "An Application of Agent-based Simulation to the New Electricity Trading Arrangements of England and Wales," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 93, Society for Computational Economics.
    8. Rothkopf, Michael H., 1999. "Daily Repetition: A Neglected Factor in the Analysis of Electricity Auctions," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 60-70, April.
    9. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pär Holmberg, 2017. "Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 372-395, October.
    2. Albert Banal-Estañol & Augusto Rupérez-Micola, 2010. "Are agent-based simulations robust? The wholesale electricity trading case," Economics Working Papers 1214, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    3. Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Saša Pekeč, 2008. "Relevance to Practice and Auction Theory: A Memorial Essay for Michael Rothkopf," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 38(5), pages 367-380, October.
    4. Eric Guerci & Stefano Ivaldi & Silvano Cincotti, 2008. "Learning Agents in an Artificial Power Exchange: Tacit Collusion, Market Power and Efficiency of Two Double-auction Mechanisms," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 32(1), pages 73-98, September.
    5. Zou, Xiaoyan, 2009. "Double-sided auction mechanism design in electricity based on maximizing social welfare," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4231-4239, November.
    6. Weidlich, Anke & Veit, Daniel, 2008. "A critical survey of agent-based wholesale electricity market models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1728-1759, July.
    7. Alexis H. Kunz & Thomas Pfeiffer, 1999. "Investitionsbudgetierung und implizite Verträge: Wie resistent ist der Groves-Mechanismus bei dynamischer Interaktion?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 203-223, March.
    8. Markus C. Arnold & Eva Ponick, 2006. "Kommunikation im Groves-Mechanismus — Ergebnisse eines Laborexperiments," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 89-120, February.
    9. Tafreshian, Amirmahdi & Masoud, Neda, 2022. "A truthful subsidy scheme for a peer-to-peer ridesharing market with incomplete information," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 130-161.
    10. Shrestha, Ratna K., 2017. "Menus of price-quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-7.
    11. Meng Zhang & Deepanshu Vasal, 2020. "Mechanism Design for Large Scale Network Utility Maximization," Papers 2003.04263, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2021.
    12. Mishra, Debasis & Parkes, David C., 2007. "Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 335-366, January.
    13. Shinji Ohseto, 2006. "Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 111-121, September.
    14. Mizukami, Hideki & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Wakayama, Takuma, 2003. "Strategy-Proof Sharing," Working Papers 1170, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    15. Martin Hellwig & Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "Public Good Provision in a Large Economy," 2009 Meeting Papers 1062, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Attila Ambrus & Emilio Calvano & Markus Reisinger, 2016. "Either or Both Competition: A "Two-Sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 189-222, August.
    17. William H. Sandholm, 2005. "Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(3), pages 885-915.
    18. Balint, T. & Lamperti, F. & Mandel, A. & Napoletano, M. & Roventini, A. & Sapio, A., 2017. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: A Survey and a Look Forward," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 252-265.
    19. Sulin Ba & Jan Stallaert & Andrew B. Whinston, 2001. "Research Commentary: Introducing a Third Dimension in Information Systems Design—The Case for Incentive Alignment," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 12(3), pages 225-239, September.
    20. Ayman Chouayakh & Aurélien Bechler & Isabel Amigo & Loutfi Nuaymi & Patrick Maillé, 2021. "A truthful ascending auction mechanism for dynamic allocation of LSA spectrum blocks," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 27-52, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ibn:masjnl:v:8:y:2013:i:1:p:147. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Canadian Center of Science and Education (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cepflch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.