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Foreign Reactions to U.S. Auctions: Implications for U.S. Bidders in Foreign Countries

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  • Halil D. Kaya
  • Julia S. Kwok

Abstract

In this study, we examine the implications of FCC Auctions for U.S. companies in foreign countries. We show that U.S. auctions will have the most detrimental effect on U.S. companies planning to serve the most attractive foreign markets. For moderately attractive markets, establishing a joint venture with a firm in the target country is crucial. The least attractive markets can become more attractive when their neighboring countries are served by U.S. companies. We discuss the foreign retaliation upon U.S. telecom auctions, U.S. companies' responses, the pressure from the U.S. Congress on the FCC, and FCC's strategies. We conclude by analyzing the foreign reactions to U.S. auctions, these reactions’ implications on the FCC, and the offsetting trends. Finally, we recommend some strategies to FCC.

Suggested Citation

  • Halil D. Kaya & Julia S. Kwok, 2016. "Foreign Reactions to U.S. Auctions: Implications for U.S. Bidders in Foreign Countries," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 6(10), pages 29-43, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:hur:ijarbs:v:6:y:2016:i:10:p:29-43
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    2. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
    3. Park, Minsoo & Lee, Sang-Woo & Choi, Yong-Jae, 2011. "Does spectrum auctioning harm consumers? Lessons from 3G licensing," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 118-126, March.
    4. van Damme, Eric, 2002. "The European UMTS-auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 846-858, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Telecommunication; telecom; telecommunication auction; spectrum; FCC;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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