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Los sistemas de prestaciones por desempleo de “experience rating”. Un análisis de los despidos temporales y los subsidios cruzados en España

Author

Listed:
  • José María Arranz

    (Universidad de Alcalá)

  • Carlos García Serrano

    (Universidad de Alcalá)

Abstract

Este artículo presenta cómo funciona un sistema de prestaciones por desempleo de “experience rating” en el que se recurre a un impuesto sobre los despidos para financiar dichas prestaciones y el tipo de cotización de cada empresa depende de su historial reciente de despidos. Se analizan algunas de sus ventajas e inconvenientes, enmarcándolo en el tema más general del reparto de los costes asociados a la rotación en el mercado de trabajo. También se examinan más en detalle dos problemas asociados al “experience rating” parcial o incompleto: el exceso de despidos temporales y la existencia de subsidios cruzados entre regiones, sectores y empresas. a partir de los datos de la Muestra Continua de Vidas laborales (MCVL), se cuantifican ambos problemas para el caso español. Los resultados pueden ofrecer indicios de los beneficios que se podrían obtener si el sistema incluyese elementos de “experience rating” en su diseño y financiación.

Suggested Citation

  • José María Arranz & Carlos García Serrano, 2015. "Los sistemas de prestaciones por desempleo de “experience rating”. Un análisis de los despidos temporales y los subsidios cruzados en España," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 212(1), pages 129-168, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2015:v:212:i:1:p:129-168
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    prestaciones por desempleo; “experience rating”; MCVL; subsidios cruzados.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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