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Carbon Reduction Initiatives, Corporate Governance and Sustainability Assurance—Do Multiple Directorships and Board Tenure Matter?

Author

Listed:
  • Yeut Hong Tham

    (Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Curtin University, Perth, WA 6845, Australia)

  • Puji Handayati

    (Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Negeri Malang, Malang 65145, Indonesia)

  • Yuni Yuningsih

    (Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Curtin University, Perth, WA 6845, Australia)

  • Zhiyue Sun

    (Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Curtin University, Perth, WA 6845, Australia)

  • Tatas Ridho Nugroho

    (Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Negeri Malang, Malang 65145, Indonesia)

Abstract

The intention of this study is to investigate carbon reduction initiatives, board characteristics and sustainability assurance in large, listed firms in Indonesia from 2016 to 2023, given the significance of climate change. Based on fixed effects regression controlling industry effects, we find a positive significant relationship between multiple directorships and carbon reduction initiatives. Additionally, we find a statistically significant association between gender-diverse boards and carbon reduction initiatives, as well as a positive association between sustainability assurance and carbon reduction initiatives. When adopting multiple directorships as a moderating variable, our results reveal a positive relationship between long-tenured board members with multiple directorships and carbon reduction initiatives, suggesting that firms with long-tenured directors and multiple directorships reduce carbon footprint. Robustness checks and endogeneity tests corroborate the main results. This study has important implications for regulators, including policymakers, and contributes to theoretical applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Yeut Hong Tham & Puji Handayati & Yuni Yuningsih & Zhiyue Sun & Tatas Ridho Nugroho, 2025. "Carbon Reduction Initiatives, Corporate Governance and Sustainability Assurance—Do Multiple Directorships and Board Tenure Matter?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(3), pages 1-19, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:17:y:2025:i:3:p:1115-:d:1580039
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    References listed on IDEAS

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