IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v15y2023i22p16006-d1281488.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Industrial Decision Analysis of Regional Coordinated Development Considering Information Distribution and Fairness Preference

Author

Listed:
  • Linwei Pan

    (School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China)

  • Xueyu Liao

    (School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China)

  • Rui Li

    (School of Management Science and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China)

  • Shuangping Cao

    (Architecture and Engineering Institute, Chongqing College of Architecture and Technology, Chongqing 401331, China)

Abstract

Regional industry synergistic planning contributes to the achievement of Goal 11 of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. The reasonable layout of regional industries is an important measure for achieving sustainable development through distinguishing between different industries. Taking into account the competitive and cooperative relationships between regional cities, this study created a Stackelberg model considering information distribution and fairness preferences. It analyzed the industrial selection strategies and influencing factors under the requirements of output maximization and profit maximization between regions. The model discussions and numerical simulation results showed that regional industrial planning and adjustment should consider both internal and external behavioral factors. The impact of information distribution and fairness preferences on the selection of heterogeneous and homogeneous industries varies. Differentiated industrial selection should be conducted based on output maximization or profit maximization. Furthermore, following cities should take the initiative to integrate into the industrial development plans of nearby large cities, and leading cities should effectively layout and optimize regional productivity. Both industrial planning and choice require the establishment of regional coordination mechanisms. By enhancing the level of mutual trust and reciprocity among cities, reducing information asymmetry, and guiding fairness preferences, regional industrial synergy is promoted, and conditions are created for sustainable industrial development.

Suggested Citation

  • Linwei Pan & Xueyu Liao & Rui Li & Shuangping Cao, 2023. "The Industrial Decision Analysis of Regional Coordinated Development Considering Information Distribution and Fairness Preference," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(22), pages 1-20, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:22:p:16006-:d:1281488
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/22/16006/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/22/16006/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alex Makarevich, 2018. "Performance feedback as a cooperation “switch”: A behavioral perspective on the success of venture capital syndicates among competitors," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(12), pages 3247-3272, December.
    2. Qing, Qiankai & Deng, Tianhu & Wang, Hongwei, 2017. "Capacity allocation under downstream competition and bargaining," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(1), pages 97-107.
    3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    4. Tony Haitao Cui & Guangwen Kong & Behrooz Pourghannad, 2020. "Is Simplicity the Ultimate Sophistication? The Superiority of Linear Pricing," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(7), pages 1767-1788, July.
    5. Bo Yan & Gaodi Liu & Xiaohua Wu & Jiwen Wu, 2021. "Decision-Making on the Supply Chain of Fresh Agricultural Products with Two-Period Price and Option Contract," Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (APJOR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 38(01), pages 1-22, February.
    6. Fan, Ruguo & Lin, Jinchai & Zhu, Kaiwei, 2019. "Study of game models and the complex dynamics of a low-carbon supply chain with an altruistic retailer under consumers’ low-carbon preference," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 528(C).
    7. Alessio Cozzolino & Frank T. Rothaermel, 2018. "Discontinuities, competition, and cooperation: Coopetitive dynamics between incumbents and entrants," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(12), pages 3053-3085, December.
    8. Li, Wei & Zhao, Xuan, 2022. "Competition or coopetition? Equilibrium analysis in the presence of process improvement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 297(1), pages 180-202.
    9. Xu Chen & Xiaojun Wang & Yusen Xia, 2019. "Production Coopetition Strategies for Competing Manufacturers that Produce Partially Substitutable Products," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 28(6), pages 1446-1464, June.
    10. Gächter, Simon & Nosenzo, Daniele & Renner, Elke & Sefton, Martin, 2010. "Sequential vs. simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(7-8), pages 515-522, August.
    11. Guan, Zhimin & Ye, Tong & Yin, Rui, 2020. "Channel coordination under Nash bargaining fairness concerns in differential games of goodwill accumulation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 285(3), pages 916-930.
    12. Hafezalkotob, Ashkan, 2017. "Competition, cooperation, and coopetition of green supply chains under regulations on energy saving levels," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 228-250.
    13. Sarah Kaplan & Keyvan Vakili, 2015. "The double-edged sword of recombination in breakthrough innovation," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(10), pages 1435-1457, October.
    14. Weixin Shang & Albert Y. Ha & Shilu Tong, 2016. "Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(1), pages 245-263, January.
    15. Ram Ranganathan & Anindya Ghosh & Lori Rosenkopf, 2018. "Competition–cooperation interplay during multifirm technology coordination: The effect of firm heterogeneity on conflict and consensus in a technology standards organization," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(12), pages 3193-3221, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zhang, Yudi & Wang, Xiaojun & Zhi, Bangdong, 2024. "Strategic investment in electric vehicle charging service: Fast charging or battery swapping," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 268(C).
    2. Liu, Zhi & Zheng, Xiao-Xue & Li, Deng-Feng & Liao, Chen-Nan & Sheu, Jiuh-Biing, 2021. "A novel cooperative game-based method to coordinate a sustainable supply chain under psychological uncertainty in fairness concerns," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    3. Gregor Schwerhoff, 2013. "Leadership and International Climate Cooperation," Working Papers 2013.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Ji, Jingna & Li, Tao & Yang, Lei, 2023. "Pricing and carbon reduction strategies for vertically differentiated firms under Cap-and-Trade regulation," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    5. Gregor Schwerhoff, 2016. "The economics of leadership in climate change mitigation," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 196-214, March.
    6. Chen, Xu & He, Jinzhe & Wang, Xiaojun, 2024. "Effects of product substitutability and power relationships on performance in triadic supply chains," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
    7. Christoph Engel & Lilia Zhurakhovska, 2013. "Do Explicit Reasons Make Legal Intervention More Effective? An Experimental Study," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_16, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Mar 2018.
    8. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2011. "Endogenous Move Structure and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 721-754, October.
    9. Loerakker, Ben & van Winden, Frans, 2017. "Emotional Leadership in an Intergroup Conflict Game Experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 143-167.
    10. Andrew M. Davis & Bin Hu & Kyle Hyndman & Anyan Qi, 2022. "Procurement for Assembly Under Asymmetric Information: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 2694-2713, April.
    11. Li, Wei & Zhao, Xuan & Chen, Jing, 2023. "Co-opetition or decentralization? A study of manufacturers’ sourcing and distribution strategies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 311(3), pages 867-886.
    12. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2011. "Endogenous Move Structure and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 721-754, October.
    13. Xiaoxuan Sun & Guangcheng Ma, 2024. "Research on Carbon Cap Regulation, Retailer Altruistic Preferences, and Green Decision-Making of Manufacturing Enterprises," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(17), pages 1-23, September.
    14. Zhang, Ranran & Ma, Weimin & Si, Hongyun & Liu, Jinjin & Liao, Le, 2021. "Cooperative game analysis of coordination mechanisms under fairness concerns of a green retailer," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    15. Kube, Sebastian & Schaube, Sebastian & Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah & Khachatryan, Elina, 2015. "Institution formation and cooperation with heterogeneous agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 248-268.
    16. Faravelli, Marco & Kirchkamp, Oliver & Rainer, Helmut, 2013. "The effect of power imbalances on incentives to make non-contractible investments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 169-185.
    17. Jun-ichi Itaya & Atsue Mizushima & Kengo Kurosaka, 2018. "Endogenous Timing and Income Inequality in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 7441, CESifo.
    18. Qingyu Zhang & Tianlong Luo, 2022. "Implications of CSR Practices for a Development Supply Chain in Alleviating Farmers’ Poverty," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(20), pages 1-29, October.
    19. Matsui, Kenji, 2022. "Should a retailer bargain over a wholesale price with a manufacturer using a dual-channel supply chain?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 300(3), pages 1050-1066.
    20. Palátová, P. & Rinn, R. & Machoň, M. & Paluš, H. & Purwestri, R.C. & Jarský, V., 2023. "Sharing economy in the forestry sector: Opportunities and barriers," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:22:p:16006-:d:1281488. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.