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Three-Party Evolutionary Game of Shared Manufacturing under the Leadership of Core Manufacturing Company

Author

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  • Peng Liu

    (School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang 110870, China)

  • Xiaoling Wei

    (School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang 110870, China)

Abstract

Shared manufacturing provides a new development direction for the transformation and upgrading of the manufacturing industry. This paper took a manufacturing company that masters core technology and has strong knowledge creation and spillover capabilities as the core manufacturing company. The core manufacturing company led two resource-complementary manufacturing companies in participating in shared manufacturing, and the additional benefits of each company participating in shared manufacturing were realized. Due to the bounded rational behavior of the participating companies and the difficulty in maximizing each’s own interests, this paper used the evolutionary game method and MATLAB to analyze the influencing factors of shared manufacturing among manufacturing companies. The goal of this study is to understand the decision-making behavior of manufacturing companies in a shared manufacturing context. The research results show that: The initial willingness to share, default losses, and excess income realized by the core manufacturing company as a result of delivering high service levels all contributed to the companies’ willingness to engage in shared production. The companies’ ability to participate in shared manufacturing was negatively impacted by cost-to-income ratio and speculative income. The allocation of additional income had a significant influence on the non-core enterprises’ decision-making: when the distribution ratio of additional income from non-core companies was low, non-core companies would be less willing to share. Although the additional income distribution ratio of core companies were high at the time, the service level of core companies would also decrease due to the reduction of non-core companies’ willingness to share.

Suggested Citation

  • Peng Liu & Xiaoling Wei, 2022. "Three-Party Evolutionary Game of Shared Manufacturing under the Leadership of Core Manufacturing Company," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(20), pages 1-16, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:20:p:13682-:d:950072
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ji, Ping & Ma, Xin & Li, Gang, 2015. "Developing green purchasing relationships for the manufacturing industry: An evolutionary game theory perspective," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 155-162.
    2. Marta Biancardi & Gianluca Iannucci & Giovanni Villani, 2022. "An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 831-847, November.
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