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The Weapon of the Weak: An Analysis of RDEU Game in the Conflict of Farmland Expropriation under the Influence of Emotion

Author

Listed:
  • Kairong Hong

    (School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Yucheng Zou

    (School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Yanwei Zhang

    (School of Tourism and Urban Management, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330032, China)

  • Kaifeng Duan

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

Abstract

During land expropriation, it is difficult to form a real antagonistic relationship between farmers and the local Government due to disparities, which means the confrontations between them are difficult to administer. The confrontation between both parties could lead to the distortion of the farmers’ resisting logic, who are supposed to be in a vulnerable position. Hence, the farmers are not necessarily in a weak position; sometimes, they even have advantages compared with the local governments. Through the combination of Quiggin’s rank-based expected utility theory and evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a conflict-induced game mechanism Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory (RDEU) evolutionary game model and discusses the evolution law of strategic behavior of land-expropriated farmers and local governments under the influence of emotion. The software simulation results show that when the farmers at the weak side think that the probability of the government adopting the strong strategy is higher than a certain cut-off point, the farmers will use the weapon of the weak to release the signal that endangers the order and force the government to adopt a compromise strategy by utilizing authoritative preference for stability. Through the interaction of heterogeneous beliefs between farmers and the government, the game of land expropriation will form an evolutionary stable equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Kairong Hong & Yucheng Zou & Yanwei Zhang & Kaifeng Duan, 2020. "The Weapon of the Weak: An Analysis of RDEU Game in the Conflict of Farmland Expropriation under the Influence of Emotion," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-21, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:12:y:2020:i:8:p:3367-:d:348283
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hongbo Guo & Mengtong Lu & Lili Ding, 2022. "The Effect of Consumer Sentiment on Manufacturers’ Green Technology Innovation: A RDEU Evolutionary Game Model," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(1), pages 1-18, December.
    2. Susu Ni & Shuliang Zou & Jiahua Chen, 2022. "Evolutionary Game Model of Internal Threats to Nuclear Security in Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plants Based on RDEU Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(4), pages 1-16, February.
    3. Zhaoyu Cao & Xu Zhao & Yucheng Zou & Kairong Hong & Yanwei Zhang, 2021. "Multidimensional Fair Fuzzy Equilibrium Evaluation of Housing Expropriation Compensation from the Perspective of Behavioral Preference: A Case Study from China," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(6), pages 1-22, March.
    4. Kairong Hong & Yucheng Zou & Mingyuan Zhu & Yanwei Zhang, 2021. "A Game Analysis of Farmland Expropriation Conflict in China under Multi-Dimensional Preference: Cooperation or Resistance?," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-29, January.
    5. Sayeh Kassaw Agegnehu & Reinfried Mansberger, 2020. "Community Involvement and Compensation Money Utilization in Ethiopia: Case Studies from Bahir Dar and Debre Markos Peri-Urban Areas," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(11), pages 1-18, June.
    6. Hu, Zhenhua & Song, Gaohui & Hu, Ziyue & Fang, Jiaqi, 2024. "An improved dynamic game analysis of farmers, enterprises and rural collective economic organizations based on idle land reuse policy," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).

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