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Digital News and Political Tweets in the Lower Austrian Municipal Elections: A Case Study on Digital Journalism and Political Communication

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  • Thomas J. Lampoltshammer

    (Department for E-Governance and Administration, University for Continuing Education Krems, 3500 Krems an der Donau, Austria)

  • Gabriele De Luca

    (Department for E-Governance and Administration, University for Continuing Education Krems, 3500 Krems an der Donau, Austria)

  • Lőrinc Thurnay

    (Department for E-Governance and Administration, University for Continuing Education Krems, 3500 Krems an der Donau, Austria)

Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem of agenda setting by news media in relation to the political discourse by politicians at the time of local elections. We first evaluate the applicability of the agenda-setting theory against the theory of policy agenda building to determine the possible alternative directions for constructing a political agenda at the time of elections. Namely, we identify a non-linear interaction between news organizations, politicians, and the general public during the electoral campaign. This interaction, in turn, shapes the dynamic evolution of the public discourse concerning politics, and it is characterized by high sensitivity to initial conditions and non-linearity. Then, we attempt to identify the presence of an evolutionary trajectory of the political discourse in Lower Austria at the time of elections by observing whether, as the time of an election approaches, the interaction between news organizations and politicians flattens and becomes more linear without the news or the politicians causing the agenda of the other to be set accordingly. Finally, we provide a new methodology for identifying the topics contained in such an agenda so that empirical verification of the proposed hypothesis becomes possible.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas J. Lampoltshammer & Gabriele De Luca & Lőrinc Thurnay, 2022. "Digital News and Political Tweets in the Lower Austrian Municipal Elections: A Case Study on Digital Journalism and Political Communication," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-20, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jscscx:v:12:y:2022:i:1:p:18-:d:1017318
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
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