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Evolution Process of Urban Industrial Land Redevelopment in China: A Perspective of Original Land Users

Author

Listed:
  • Fang He

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

  • Yuan Yi

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

  • Yuxuan Si

    (School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

Abstract

The crucial role of urban industrial land redevelopment in sustainable urban renewal has garnered widespread attention. While some scholars have explored the interest game among stakeholders in industrial land redevelopment, they primarily focus on the government-led model. Moreover, there remains a research gap concerning the impact of government intervention on the redevelopment of industrial land. This article utilizes evolutionary game theory to investigate the interest game between local governments and original land users in the model of urban industrial land redevelopment dominated by original land users. We establish evolutionary game models considering incentives and the combination of incentives and regulations, explore the interest balance strategy, and examine the impact of positive incentives and mandatory regulations on industrial land redevelopment. Furthermore, we employ a numerical simulation to unveil the impact of initial strategies and parameter adjustments on game strategy. The research results are as follows: (1) Under the original land user-led redevelopment model, only two evolutionary stability strategies exist: either the original land users implement industrial land redevelopment with positive responses from local governments, or neither party advances the process. (2) Government intervention is pivotal in facilitating the redevelopment of inefficient industrial land as economic subsidies and punitive measures motivate more participants to adopt proactive strategies. (3) The increase in government support positively correlates with the likelihood of industrial land redevelopment implementation by original land users. (4) The interests and costs of original land users emerge as crucial parameters influencing strategic decisions. This study enriches the understanding of the interests of core participants in industrial land redevelopment and provides valuable insights for sustainable urban renewal.

Suggested Citation

  • Fang He & Yuan Yi & Yuxuan Si, 2024. "Evolution Process of Urban Industrial Land Redevelopment in China: A Perspective of Original Land Users," Land, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-22, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jlands:v:13:y:2024:i:4:p:548-:d:1379286
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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