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The Factors that Influence Human Resources on Affordable Housing Delivery within Restraint of Budget

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  • Imisioluseyi Akinyede

    (Department of Civil Engineering and Surveying, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Bellville Campus, Cape Town 7535, South Africa)

  • Julius Fapohunda

    (Department of Civil Engineering and Surveying, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Bellville Campus, Cape Town 7535, South Africa)

  • Rainer Haldenwang

    (Department of Civil Engineering and Surveying, Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Bellville Campus, Cape Town 7535, South Africa)

Abstract

The study aims to establish the factors influencing human resources on cost, since the construction cost of housing delivery is often above budgeted cost. The challenges occurred due to unsustainable practices in the use of human resources, design-related issues, matching resources availability with cost and time frame problems. The methodology used is a sequential mixed method to achieve the aim and objective of the study, for this purpose, construction managers and stakeholders were considered as research respondents. Data collected was analysed on SPSS software version 25, with the application of a descriptive statistics analysis technique. Findings deduced are involvement of all team members in the planning and implementation process will enhance mutual relationships, less conflict and fewer controversies on design, while documenting delivery roles and responsibilities among construction team members will increase the satisfaction of interest and efficient resources utilisation. This study establishes “factors regulating human resources management on construction cost and “strong component factors influencing human resources on cost”. The study then assembles the factors to develop an operational framework that will control construction resources management on cost, as a guide to improve competency and sustainable techniques for affordable housing delivery within the income limit of the poor people in South Africa.

Suggested Citation

  • Imisioluseyi Akinyede & Julius Fapohunda & Rainer Haldenwang, 2020. "The Factors that Influence Human Resources on Affordable Housing Delivery within Restraint of Budget," J, MDPI, vol. 3(3), pages 1-16, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jjopen:v:3:y:2020:i:3:p:19-265:d:377563
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Argaw Tarekegn Gurmu, 2020. "Fuzzy synthetic evaluation of human resource management practices influencing construction labour productivity," International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 70(2), pages 256-276, March.
    2. Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1997. "Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 314-341, June.
    3. Aliyu Ibrahim Saidu & Chunho Yeom, 2020. "Success Criteria Evaluation for a Sustainable and Affordable Housing Model: A Case for Improving Household Welfare in Nigeria Cities," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-16, January.
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