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Exploring the Factors Triggering Occupational Ethics Risk of Technology Transaction in Chinese Construction Industry

Author

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  • Xun Liu

    (School of Civil Engineering, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215000, China)

  • Sen Lin

    (Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong 999077, China)

  • Lixing Liu

    (School of Civil Engineering, Suzhou University of Science and Technology, Suzhou 215000, China)

  • Fei Qian

    (Institute of Engineering Management, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China)

  • Kun Zhang

    (Institute of Engineering Management, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China)

Abstract

The importance of occupational ethics risk considerations during technology transaction in the construction industry is acknowledged. This is particularly in that the industry plays a significant part in a nation’s development. The technology transaction has seen an increase in activity due to massive infrastructure development programmers adopted by governments and increase in external investment. The technology transaction, like any other, is not immune to unethical occupational behavior. This study aims to investigate the source of occupational ethics risk during technology transaction in the Chinese construction industry. A review of literature demonstrated that a number of contextual factors can influence unethical occupational risk practices. In total, 130 engineering practitioners took part in a questionnaire survey to explore the source of occupational ethics risk during the technology transaction in the Chinese construction industry. Firstly, there were 25 factors identified through literature review overall, which were sorted and analyzed. Among the twenty-five factors, three were identified as the most significant factors: Unreasonable incentives for technology trading; poor regulation; and asymmetry of information. Then, through exploratory factor analysis (EPA) method, the twenty-five factors were divided into seven groups: legal environment, industry environment, incompleteness of information, asymmetry of information, difficulty of observation of information, differences between the two sides of cooperation, and incorrect conceptual awareness. This study provided an added dimension to the understanding of occupational ethics risk issues during the technology transaction in the Chinese construction industry. This paper therefore contributes to the list of countries where similar studies have been undertaken.

Suggested Citation

  • Xun Liu & Sen Lin & Lixing Liu & Fei Qian & Kun Zhang, 2020. "Exploring the Factors Triggering Occupational Ethics Risk of Technology Transaction in Chinese Construction Industry," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(4), pages 1-18, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:17:y:2020:i:4:p:1175-:d:319876
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ivona Ivić & Anita Cerić, 2023. "Risks Caused by Information Asymmetry in Construction Projects: A Systematic Literature Review," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-25, June.

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