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High Cost of Survival Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation

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  • Oleg Smirnov

    (Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA)

Abstract

Living organisms expend energy to sustain survival, a process which is reliant on consuming resources—termed here as the “cost of survival”. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a classic model of social interaction, individual payoffs depend on choices to either provide benefits to others at a personal cost (cooperate) or exploit others to maximize personal gain (defect). We demonstrate that in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), a simple “Always Cooperate” (ALLC) strategy evolves and remains evolutionarily stable when the cost of survival is sufficiently high, meaning exploited cooperators have a low probability of survival. We derive a rule for the evolutionary stability of cooperation, x/z > T/R , where x represents the duration of mutual cooperation, z the duration of exploitation, T the defector’s free-riding payoff, and R the payoff for mutual cooperation. This finding suggests that higher survival costs can enhance social welfare by selecting for cooperative strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Oleg Smirnov, 2025. "High Cost of Survival Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation," Games, MDPI, vol. 16(1), pages 1-12, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:16:y:2025:i:1:p:4-:d:1562915
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jo Ridley & Douglas W. Yu & William J. Sutherland, 2005. "Why long-lived species are more likely to be social: the role of local dominance," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 16(2), pages 358-363, March.
    2. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
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