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One Justice for All? Social Dilemmas, Environmental Risks and Different Notions of Distributive Justice

Author

Listed:
  • Ulf Liebe

    (Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK)

  • Heidi Bruderer Enzler

    (School of Social Work, Zurich University of Applied Sciences, 8037 Zurich, Switzerland)

  • Andreas Diekmann

    (Institute of Sociology, University of Leipzig, 04107 Leipzig, Germany
    Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences, ETH Zurich, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland)

  • Peter Preisendörfer

    (Institute of Sociology, University of Mainz, 55128 Mainz, Germany)

Abstract

A just or fair distribution of environmental bads and goods is important for solving environmental social dilemmas and is a core idea of environmental justice politics and research. Environmental justice is mostly associated with egalitarianism as the sole justice principle for all people. In contrast, we argue that it is important to uncover and consider heterogeneity in justice concerns to achieve socially accepted solutions to environmental social dilemmas. With noise pollution as an example, we explore citizens’ preferences for justice principles regarding the allocation of politically initiated environmental benefits. In our survey in four European cities, respondents were asked to choose between different outcomes of a program to reduce road traffic noise in line with the following four notions of distributive justice: equal shares, equal outcomes, the greatest benefit for the least advantaged (Rawls), and the greatest benefit for the greatest number (Bentham). We found that most respondents chose Rawls’ principle, a preference that was stable over time but weaker when explicitly introducing the veil of ignorance. The preference for Rawls notwithstanding, we observed substantial heterogeneity in justice preferences. Multinomial logit analyses of survey and geo-referenced data on noise exposure showed that respondents with a higher socio-economic status and lower exposure to traffic noise were more likely to choose Rawls’ principle. Taken together, our study confirms the prominence of Rawls’ principle, demonstrates empirically the heterogeneity of justice preferences, and calls for more direct measurements of such preferences in research on environmental social dilemmas, environmental justice, and beyond.

Suggested Citation

  • Ulf Liebe & Heidi Bruderer Enzler & Andreas Diekmann & Peter Preisendörfer, 2024. "One Justice for All? Social Dilemmas, Environmental Risks and Different Notions of Distributive Justice," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-23, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:15:y:2024:i:4:p:25-:d:1427152
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    References listed on IDEAS

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