On Rational Choice and the Representation of Decision Problems

In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives—modeled as a set . In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by the outside world in a structured way. Online search results are lists of items, wine menus are often lists of lists (grouped by type or country), and online shopping often involves filtering items which can be viewed as navigating a tree . Representations constrain how an agent can choose. At the same time, an agent can also leverage representations when choosing, simplifying their choice process. For instance, in the case of a list he or she can use the order in which alternatives are represented to make their choice. In this paper, we model representations and decision procedures operating on them. We show that choice procedures are related to classical choice functions by a canonical mapping. Using this mapping, we can ask whether properties of choice functions can be lifted onto the choice procedures which induce them. We focus on the obvious benchmark: rational choice. We fully characterize choice procedures which can be rationalized by a strict preference relation for general representations including lists, list of lists, trees and others. Our framework can thereby be used as the basis for new tests of rational behavior. Classical choice theory operates on very limited information, typically budgets or menus and final choices. This is in stark contrast to the vast amount of data that specifically web companies collect about their users’ choice process. Our framework offers a way to integrate such data into economic choice models.