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Brexit and Power in the Council of the European Union

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  • László Á. Kóczy

    (Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Tóth Kálmán u. 4., H-1097 Budapest, Hungary
    Department of Finance, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Magyar Tudósok Körútja 2., H-1111 Budapest, Hungary)

Abstract

The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union has had profound economic and political effects. Here, we look at a particular aspect, the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. Using the Shapley–Shubik power index, we calculate the member states’ powers with and without the United Kingdom and update earlier power forecasts using the Eurostat’s latest population projections. There is a remarkably sharp relation between population size and the change in power: Brexit increases the largest members’ powers while decreasing the smallest ones’ powers.

Suggested Citation

  • László Á. Kóczy, 2021. "Brexit and Power in the Council of the European Union," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-10, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:12:y:2021:i:2:p:51-:d:578572
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jochen Staudacher & Felix Wagner & Jan Filipp, 2021. "Dynamic Programming for Computing Power Indices for Weighted Voting Games with Precoalitions," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-17, December.
    2. D'ora Gr'eta Petr'oczy & L'aszl'o Csat'o, 2023. "Voting power in the Council of the European Union: A comprehensive sensitivity analysis," Papers 2312.16878, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2024.

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