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A Game-Theoretic Rent-Seeking Framework for Improving Multipath TCP Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Shiva Raj Pokhrel

    (School of Information Technology, Deakin University, Geelong, VIC 3220, Australia)

  • Carey Williamson

    (Department of Computer Science, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada)

Abstract

There is no well-defined utility function for existing multipath TCP algorithms. Therefore, network utility maximization (NUM) for MPTCP is a complex undertaking. To resolve this, we develop a novel condition under which Kelly’s NUM mechanism may be used to explicitly compute the equilibrium. We accomplish this by defining a new utility function for MPTCP by employing Tullock’s rent-seeking paradigm from game theory. We investigate the convergence of no-regret learning in the underlying network games with continuous actions. Based on our understanding of the design space, we propose an original MPTCP algorithm that generalizes existing algorithms and strikes a good balance among the important properties. We implemented this algorithm in the Linux kernel, and we evaluated its performance experimentally.

Suggested Citation

  • Shiva Raj Pokhrel & Carey Williamson, 2022. "A Game-Theoretic Rent-Seeking Framework for Improving Multipath TCP Performance," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-23, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jftint:v:14:y:2022:i:9:p:257-:d:901103
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Panayotis Mertikopoulos & William H. Sandholm, 2016. "Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(4), pages 1297-1324, November.
    2. Eitan Altman & Manjesh Kumar Hanawal & Rajesh Sundaresan, 2016. "Generalising diagonal strict concavity property for uniqueness of Nash equilibrium," Indian Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 213-228, June.
    3. Ramesh Johari & John N. Tsitsiklis, 2004. "Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 29(3), pages 407-435, August.
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