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An Efficient Dynamic Load Balancing Scheme Based on Nash Bargaining in SDN

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  • Guoyan Li

    (School of computer and information engineering, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, China)

  • Kaixin Li

    (School of computer and information engineering, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, China)

  • Yi Liu

    (School of computer and information engineering, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, China)

  • Yuheng Pan

    (School of computer and information engineering, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, China)

Abstract

Static multi-controller deployment architecture cannot adapt to the drastic changes of network traffic, which will lead to a load imbalance between controllers, resulting in a high packet loss rate, high latency, and other network performance degradation problems. In this paper, an efficient dynamic load balancing scheme based on Nash bargaining is proposed for a distributed software-defined network. Firstly, considering the connectivity of network nodes, the switch migration problem is transformed into a network mapping relationship reconstruction problem. Then, we establish the Nash bargaining game model to fairly optimize the two contradictory goals of migration cost and load balance. Finally, the model is solved by an improved firefly algorithm, and the optimal network mapping state is obtained. The experimental results show that this scheme can optimize the migration cost and load balance at the same time. Compared with the existing research schemes, the migration process of the switch is optimized, and, while effectively balancing the load of the control plane, the migration cost is reduced by 14.5%.

Suggested Citation

  • Guoyan Li & Kaixin Li & Yi Liu & Yuheng Pan, 2019. "An Efficient Dynamic Load Balancing Scheme Based on Nash Bargaining in SDN," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 11(12), pages 1-18, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jftint:v:11:y:2019:i:12:p:252-:d:294762
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Fraga & Matías Micheletto & Andrés Llinás & Rodrigo Santos & Paula Zabala, 2022. "Flow Scheduling in Data Center Networks with Time and Energy Constraints: A Software-Defined Network Approach," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-26, February.

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