IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jagris/v12y2022i11p1874-d966702.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Enterprise Behavior Strategies in Public-Private-Partnership Farmland Consolidation

Author

Listed:
  • Wenxiong Wang

    (College of Public Administration, Huazhong Agricultural University, 1 Shizishan Street, Wuhan 430070, China)

  • Ziying Song

    (College of Public Administration, Huazhong Agricultural University, 1 Shizishan Street, Wuhan 430070, China)

  • Wei Zhou

    (Department of Planning and Landscape Architecture, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53001-53536, USA)

  • Yong Jiang

    (College of Public Administration, Huazhong Agricultural University, 1 Shizishan Street, Wuhan 430070, China)

  • Yuan Sun

    (College of Public Administration, Huazhong Agricultural University, 1 Shizishan Street, Wuhan 430070, China)

Abstract

To improve the implementation effect of farmland consolidation (FC) and promote the development of agricultural modernization, the Chinese government has vigorously promoted the application of the public-private-partnership for farmland consolidation (PPP-FC). However, many conflicts of interest among stakeholders exist in PPP-FC. Especially in the implementation stage of PPP-FC, most private enterprises probably prefer to decrease the costs of construction to increase the profits when government incentives and supervision are insufficient. Based on this, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and the enterprises to explore the motivations of the enterprises’ speculative behaviors, the interaction mechanism and the evolutionary stability strategies of both parties and uses numerical simulations to visually analyze the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism and the strategic change of both sides. Our results show that (1) the enterprise’s farmland operating income is the decisive factor that affects behavioral choices: the situation for the income of a low-effort strategy is greater than that of a high-effort strategy is the root cause of speculative behavior; (2) the incentive mechanism can simultaneously affect the decision-making direction and speed of both the government and the enterprises, especially punishment which can effectively regulate the behaviors of the enterprises; (3) government regulation costs and officials’ desire for promotion are important factors affecting their strategic choices: regulation costs negatively impact the government’s plans to adopt an incentive strategy and the promotion desire positively promotes the government implementing incentive measures for the enterprises; and (4) the supervision level of farmers is an important factor that affects the strategic choices of both the government and the enterprises: farmers supervision is an effective remedy for inadequate government regulation and constrains the government’s behavior. Finally, the paper proposes corresponding policy recommendations to improve the implementation effect of PPP-FC and also provides an important reference for other developing countries to formulate PPP-FC incentive mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Wenxiong Wang & Ziying Song & Wei Zhou & Yong Jiang & Yuan Sun, 2022. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Enterprise Behavior Strategies in Public-Private-Partnership Farmland Consolidation," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 12(11), pages 1-25, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jagris:v:12:y:2022:i:11:p:1874-:d:966702
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2077-0472/12/11/1874/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2077-0472/12/11/1874/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
    2. Zhang, Xiaobin & de Vries, Walter Timo & Li, Guan & Ye, Yanmei & Zheng, Hongyu & Wang, Mengran, 2019. "A behavioral analysis of farmers during land reallocation processes of land consolidation in China: Insights from Guangxi and Shandong provinces," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    3. Zhang, Dongli & Wang, Wenxiong & Zhou, Wei & Zhang, Xiaoling & Zuo, Jian, 2020. "The effect on poverty alleviation and income increase of rural land consolidation in different models: A China study," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    4. Zhou, Yang & Li, Yamei & Xu, Chenchen, 2020. "Land consolidation and rural revitalization in China: Mechanisms and paths," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    5. Fenling Feng & Chengguang Liu & Jiaqi Zhang, 2020. "China's Railway Transportation Safety Regulation System Based on Evolutionary Game Theory and System Dynamics," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(10), pages 1944-1966, October.
    6. Wang, Rongyu & Tan, Rong, 2020. "Patterns of revenue distribution in rural residential land consolidation in contemporary China: The perspective of property rights delineation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    7. Zhang, Yue & Wang, Wenxiong & Feng, Yanfei, 2022. "Impact of different models of rural land consolidation on rural household poverty vulnerability," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    8. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Zhang, Bangbang & Niu, Wenhao & Ma, Linyan & Zuo, Xuyang & Kong, Xiangbin & Chen, Haibin & Zhang, Yifan & Chen, Wei & Zhao, Minjuan & Xia, Xianli, 2019. "A company-dominated pattern of land consolidation to solve land fragmentation problem and its effectiveness evaluation: A case study in a hilly region of Guangxi Autonomous Region, Southwest China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    10. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    11. Peng, Jianchao & Yan, Siqi & Strijker, Dirk & Wu, Qun & Chen, Wei & Ma, Zhiyuan, 2020. "The influence of place identity on perceptions of landscape change: Exploring evidence from rural land consolidation projects in Eastern China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    12. Xin, Liangjie & Li, Xiubin, 2018. "China should not massively reclaim new farmland," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 12-15.
    13. Zhou, Yang & Guo, Liying & Liu, Yansui, 2019. "Land consolidation boosting poverty alleviation in China: Theory and practice," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 339-348.
    14. Barati, Ali Akbar & Azadi, Hossein & Scheffran, Jürgen, 2021. "Agricultural land fragmentation in Iran: Application of game theory," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    15. Yuyu Liu & Duan Ji & Lin Zhang & Jingjing An & Wenyan Sun, 2021. "Rural Financial Development Impacts on Agricultural Technology Innovation: Evidence from China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(3), pages 1-17, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Qizheng He & Yong Sun & Maoan Yi, 2023. "Evolutionary Game of Pesticide Reduction Management for Sustainable Agriculture: An Analysis Based on Local Governments, Farmers, and Consumers," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(12), pages 1-19, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Li, Hanbing & Jin, Xiaobin & McCormick, Barbara Prack & Tittonell, Pablo & Liu, Jing & Han, Bo & Sun, Rui & Zhou, Yinkang, 2023. "Analysis of the contribution of land consolidation to sustainable poverty alleviation under various natural conditions," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    2. Wang, Ge & Li, Xiaoqiu & Gao, Yingjie & Zeng, Chen & Wang, Bingkun & Li, Xiangyu & Li, Xintong, 2023. "How does land consolidation drive rural industrial development? Qualitative and quantitative analysis of 32 land consolidation cases in China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    3. Dongli Zhang & Lihong Yu & Wenxiong Wang, 2022. "Promoting Effect of Whole-Region Comprehensive Land Consolidation on Rural Revitalization from the Perspective of Farm Households: A China Study," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-24, October.
    4. Xie, Jinhua & Yang, Gangqiao & Wang, Ge & Song, Yan & Yang, Fan, 2021. "How do different rural-land-consolidation modes shape farmers’ ecological production behaviors?," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    5. Xia, Fangzhou & Huang, Jing & Zhang, Zhengfeng, 2024. "Government concerns, the benefit cliff, and land use: A comparative study of rural impoverished and marginalised impoverished groups," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    6. Wang, Ziyang & Wang, Wenxiong & Yu, Lihong & Zhang, Dongli, 2022. "Multidimensional poverty alleviation effect of different rural land consolidation models: A case study of Hubei and Guizhou, China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    7. Zhou, Jian & Cao, Xiaoshu, 2020. "What is the policy improvement of China’s land consolidation? Evidence from completed land consolidation projects in Shaanxi Province," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    8. Zhou, Yang & Li, Xunhuan & Liu, Yansui, 2020. "Land use change and driving factors in rural China during the period 1995-2015," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    9. Wang, Wenxiong & Lan, Yuanqin & Wang, Xu, 2021. "Impact of livelihood capital endowment on poverty alleviation of households under rural land consolidation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    10. Yan Sun & Xiaojun Song & Jing Ma & Haochen Yu & Xiaoping Ge & Gang-Jun Liu & Fu Chen, 2021. "Assessing the Effectiveness for Achieving Policy Objectives of Land Consolidation in China: Evidence from Project Practices in Jiangsu Province from 2001 to 2017," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(24), pages 1-20, December.
    11. Cheng, Xin & Chen, Jia & Jiang, Shiwei & Dai, Yan & Shuai, Chuanmin & Li, Wenjing & Liu, Yue & Wang, Chaofan & Zhou, Min & Zou, Lianghui & Zhang, Pan & Kang, Xiwen, 2021. "The impact of rural land consolidation on household poverty alleviation: The moderating effects of human capital endowment," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    12. Jin, Tao & Jiang, Yulian & Liu, Xingwen, 2023. "Evolutionary game analysis of the impact of dynamic dual credit policy on new energy vehicles after subsidy cancellation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 440(C).
    13. Xiongwei Quan & Gaoshan Zuo & Helin Sun, 2022. "Risk Perception Thresholds and Their Impact on the Behavior of Nearby Residents in Waste to Energy Project Conflict: An Evolutionary Game Analysis," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(9), pages 1-20, May.
    14. J. Doyne Farmer, 2002. "Market force, ecology and evolution," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 11(5), pages 895-953, November.
    15. Wei Wang & Yanbin Li & Jinzhong Li & Yun Li, 2024. "Can pumped-storage power stations stimulate rural revitalization? Evidence from the four-party evolutionary game," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 595-645, July.
    16. Zhuozhuo Gou & Yansong Deng, 2021. "Dynamic Model of Collaboration in Multi-Agent System Based on Evolutionary Game Theory," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-19, October.
    17. Fisher, Eric ON. & Kakkar, Vikas, 2004. "On the evolution of comparative advantage in matching models," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 169-193, October.
    18. Lili Zhang & Baoqing Hu & Ze Zhang & Gaodou Liang & Simin Huang, 2023. "Comprehensive Evaluation of Ecological-Economic Value of Guangxi Based on Land Consolidation," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-25, March.
    19. Faggini, Marisa & Parziale, Anna, 2011. "Fitness landscape and tax planning: NK model for fiscal federalism," MPRA Paper 33770, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Shirzad, Hossein & Barati, Ali Akbar & Ehteshammajd, Shaghayegh & Goli, Imaneh & Siamian, Narges & Moghaddam, Saghi Movahhed & Pour, Mahdad & Tan, Rong & Janečková, Kristina & Sklenička, Petr & Azadi,, 2022. "Agricultural land tenure system in Iran: An overview," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jagris:v:12:y:2022:i:11:p:1874-:d:966702. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.