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Optimal nonlinear income taxation with costly tax avoidance

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  • Borys Grochulski

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  • Borys Grochulski, 2007. "Optimal nonlinear income taxation with costly tax avoidance," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 93(Win), pages 77-109.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2007:i:win:p:77-109:n:v.93no.1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lacker, Jeffrey M & Weinberg, John A, 1989. "Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1345-1363, December.
    2. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    3. Schroyen, Fred, 1997. "Pareto efficient income taxation under costly monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 343-366, September.
    4. Lacker, Jeffrey M. & Levy, Robert J. & Weinberg, John A., 1990. "Incentive compatible financial contracts, asset prices, and the value of control," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 31-56, March.
    5. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
    6. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Eduardo Perez‐Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Test Design Under Falsification," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1109-1142, May.
    3. Augustin Landier & Guillaume Plantin, 2017. "Taxing the Rich," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(3), pages 1186-1209.
    4. Georges Casamatta, 2023. "Optimal income taxation with tax avoidance and endogenous labour supply," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(3), pages 913-939, August.
    5. Augustin Landier & Guillaume Plantin, 2017. "Taxing the Rich," SciencePo Working papers hal-03391964, HAL.
    6. Landier, Augustin & Plantin, Guillaume, 2011. "Inequality, tax avoidance and financial instability," TSE Working Papers 11-282, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    7. Skreta, Vasiliki & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2017. "Information Design under Falsification," CEPR Discussion Papers 12271, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6poqlonjhj8fdpldq7rs4pqcu9 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Huang, Jason & Rios, Juan, 2016. "Optimal tax mix with income tax non-compliance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 52-63.
    10. Georges Casamatta, 2021. "Optimal income taxation with tax avoidance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(3), pages 534-550, June.
    11. Jan U. Auerbach, 2019. "Property rights enforcement with unverifiable incomes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 701-735, October.
    12. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
    15. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3lf2qe5um58328r4d5r2rq9noc is not listed on IDEAS
    16. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3lf2qe5um58328r4d5r2rq9noc is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Casamatta, Georges, 2011. "Optimal income taxation with tax avoidance," CEPR Discussion Papers 8608, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Daniel R. Carroll, 2013. "The demand for income tax progressivity in the growth model," Working Papers (Old Series) 1106, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    19. Georges Casamatta, 2023. "Optimal income taxation with tax avoidance and endogenous labor supply," Post-Print hal-04015963, HAL.
    20. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6poqlonjhj8fdpldq7rs4pqcu9 is not listed on IDEAS

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