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Systemic Risk and the Pursuit of Efficiency

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Abstract

In this essay, senior economist Kartik Athreya identifies systemic risk with the presence of linkages between market participants, where problems for one directly create problems for others. He argues that such situations can arise from the use of contractual arrangements, especially debt that requires frequent refinancing and liquidation in the event of an inability to repay. The presence of spillover effects can, in turn, lead to outcomes in the wake of shocks that can be improved via policy intervention. Nonetheless, he cautions against taking this as a license to intervene after the fact, and instead suggests that observed contracting arrangements may be important in promoting efficient trade between parties from a before-the-shock perspective.

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  • Kartik B. Athreya, 2015. "Systemic Risk and the Pursuit of Efficiency," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 1Q, pages 23-47.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:00027
    DOI: 10.21144/eq1010103
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    1. Athreya, Kartik B., 2014. "Big Ideas in Macroeconomics: A Nontechnical View," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262019736, December.
    2. Arantxa Jarque & David A. Price, 2015. "Living Wills: A Tool for Curbing Too Big to Fail," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 1Q, pages 77-94.
    3. Andreas Richter & Thomas C. Wilson, 2020. "Covid-19: implications for insurer risk management and the insurability of pandemic risk," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 45(2), pages 171-199, September.

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