IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedpbp/00002.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Banking Policy Review: Did Dodd–Frank End ‘Too Big to Fail’?

Author

Listed:
  • Ryan Johnston

Abstract

Postcrisis bank reform was intended to end market perceptions that if a big bank fails, the government will have no choice but to bail it out. Ryan Johnston examines the evidence from recent studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryan Johnston, 2016. "Banking Policy Review: Did Dodd–Frank End ‘Too Big to Fail’?," Banking Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q4, pages 16-20.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpbp:00002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/economy/articles/economic-insights/2016/q4/bpr-dodd-frank.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hughes, Joseph P. & Mester, Loretta J., 2013. "Who said large banks don’t experience scale economies? Evidence from a risk-return-driven cost function," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 559-585.
    2. Javed I. Ahmed & Christopher Anderson & Rebecca Zarutskie, 2015. "Are the Borrowing Costs of Large Financial Firms Unusual?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-24, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. O'Hara, Maureen & Shaw, Wayne, 1990. "Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail."," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1587-1600, December.
    4. Gandhi, Priyank & Lustig, Hanno & Plazzi, Alberto, 2016. "Equity Is Cheap for Large Financial Institutions: The International Evidence," Research Papers 3454, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    5. Philip E. Strahan, 2013. "Too Big to Fail: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 43-61, November.
    6. Acharya, Viral & Anginer, Deniz & Warburton, Joe, 2016. "The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees," MPRA Paper 79700, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Bassett, William F., 2016. "Using Insured Deposits to Refine Estimates of the Large Bank Funding Advantage," Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 41-91, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gündüz, Yalin, 2020. "The market impact of systemic risk capital surcharges," Discussion Papers 09/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    2. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2019_022 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Tölö, Eero & Jokivuolle, Esa & Viren, Matti, 2019. "Has banks' monitoring of other banks strengthened post-crisis? Evidence from the European overnight market," Research Discussion Papers 22/2019, Bank of Finland.
    4. Javed Ahmed & Christopher Anderson & Rebecca Zarutskie, 2015. "Are the Borrowing Costs of Large Financial Firms Unusual?," Working Papers 15-10, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    5. Tölö, Eero & Jokivuolle, Esa & Viren, Matti, 2019. "Has banks' monitoring of other banks strengthened post-crisis? Evidence from the European overnight market," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 22/2019, Bank of Finland.
    6. repec:bof:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201512151482 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2015_029 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Tölö, Eero & Jokivuolle, Esa & Virén, Matti, 2015. "Are too-big-to-fail banks history in Europe? Evidence from overnight interbank loans," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 29/2015, Bank of Finland.
    9. Tölö, Eero & Jokivuolle, Esa & Virén, Matti, 2015. "Are too-big-to-fail banks history in Europe? Evidence from overnight interbank loans," Research Discussion Papers 29/2015, Bank of Finland.
    10. Samuel Antill & Asani Sarkar, 2018. "Is size everything?," Staff Reports 864, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    11. repec:zbw:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201512151482 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Eero Tölö & Esa Jokivuolle & Matti Viren, 2021. "Have Too-Big-to-Fail Expectations Diminished? Evidence from the European Overnight Interbank Market," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 60(1), pages 25-54, August.
    13. Thomas Barnebeck Andersen & Peter Sandholt Jensen, 2022. "Too Big to Fail and Moral Hazard: Evidence from an Epoch of Unregulated Commercial Banking," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 70(4), pages 808-830, December.
    14. Zhu, Jiaqing & Li, Guangzhong & Li, Jie, 2017. "Merge to be too big to fail: A real option approach," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 342-353.
    15. Iftekhar Hasan & Emma Peng & Maya Waisman & Meng Yan, 2024. "The effect of bank organizational risk-management on the pricing of non-deposit debt," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-27, August.
    16. Poghosyan, Tigran & Werger, Charlotte & de Haan, Jakob, 2016. "Size and support ratings of US banks," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 236-247.
    17. Poghosyan, Tigran & Werger, Charlotte & de Haan, Jakob, 2016. "Size and support ratings of US banks," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 236-247.
    18. Michael G. Arghyrou & Maria Dolores Gadea, 2019. "Private bank deposits and macro/fiscal risk in the euro-area," CESifo Working Paper Series 7532, CESifo.
    19. Nicola Cetorelli & James Traina, 2021. "Resolving “Too Big to Fail”," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 60(1), pages 1-23, August.
    20. Acharya, Viral & Anginer, Deniz & Warburton, Joe, 2016. "The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees," MPRA Paper 79700, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Dewenter, Kathryn L. & Riddick, Leigh A., 2018. "What's the value of a TBTF guaranty? Evidence from the G-SII designation for insurance companies✰," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 70-85.
    22. Dong, Yi & Hou, Qiannan & Ni, Chenkai, 2021. "Implicit government guarantees and credit ratings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    23. Akhtaruzzaman, Md & Chiah, Mardy & Docherty, Paul & Zhong, Angel, 2021. "Betting against bank profitability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 192(C), pages 304-323.
    24. Richard K. Crump & João A. C. Santos, 2018. "Review of New York Fed studies on the effects of post-crisis banking reforms," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue 24-2, pages 71-90.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank crises; government bailouts;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedpbp:00002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Beth Paul (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbphus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.