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Commentary on \\"Risk and return of publicly held versus privately owned banks\\"

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  • Philip E. Strahan

Abstract

This paper was part of the conference \\"Beyond Pillar 3 in International Banking Regulation: Disclosure and Market Discipline of Financial Firms,\\" cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia Business School, October 2-3, 2003.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip E. Strahan, 2004. "Commentary on \\"Risk and return of publicly held versus privately owned banks\\"," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 109-113.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednep:y:2004:i:sep:p:109-113:n:v.10no.2
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    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/04v10n2/0409stra.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, 2001. "Market Discipline in the Governance of US Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring versus Influencing," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 107-146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Stephen D. Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q III, pages 24-36.
    6. Kroszner, Randall S & Strahan, Philip E, 1996. "Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift Crisis: Dividends, Mutual-to-Stock Conversions, and Financial Distress," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1285-1319, September.
    7. Flannery, Mark J, 1998. "Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 273-305, August.
    8. Stephen D. Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Working Papers 9507, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    9. Billett, Matthew T. & Garfinkel, Jon A. & O'Neal, Edward S., 1998. "The cost of market versus regulatory discipline in banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 333-358, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. V.M. Morais Pereira & J.A. Candeias Bonito Filipe, 2018. "Quality of Board Members’ Training and Bank Financial Performance: Evidence from Portugal," International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), vol. 0(3), pages 47-79.
    2. repec:ers:journl:v:vi:y:2018:i:3:p:47-79 is not listed on IDEAS

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