IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedmsr/87.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Financial intermediary-coalitions

Author

Listed:
  • John H. Boyd
  • Edward C. Prescott

Abstract

This paper studies an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information and shows that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment. It establishes that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors? private information core allocations. These intermediaries, which are coalitions of agents, exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium: they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents; they produce information about investment projects; and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers.

Suggested Citation

  • John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott, . "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:87
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr87.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/common/pub_detail.cfm?pb_autonum_id=368
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Smith, Bruce D., 1984. "Private information, deposit interest rates, and the `stability' of the banking system," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 293-317, November.
    2. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-20, February.
    3. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
    4. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    5. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
    6. Williamson, Stephen D., 1986. "Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
    7. Haubrich, Joseph G. & King, Robert G., 1990. "Banking and insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 361-386, December.
    8. Townsend, Robert M., 1983. "Theories of intermediated structures," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 221-272, January.
    9. Ram T. S. Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, 1984. "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 415-432.
    10. Robert M. Townsend, . "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    11. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Economides, Nicholas & Hubbard, R Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1996. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 667-704, October.
    2. Ross Levine & Norman Loayza & Thorsten Beck, 2002. "Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Leonardo Hernández & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.),Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 2, pages 031-084, Central Bank of Chile.
    3. Pedro S. Amaral & Erwan Quintin, 2005. "Finance matters," Center for Latin America Working Papers 0104, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    4. William P. Osterberg, 1990. "Bank capital requirements and leverage: a review of the literature," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 26(Q IV), pages 2-12.
    5. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Greenbaum, Stuart I. & Thakor, Anjan V., 1986. "Information reusability, competition and bank asset quality," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 243-253, June.
    6. Longhofer, Stanley D. & Santos, Joao A. C., 2000. "The Importance of Bank Seniority for Relationship Lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 57-89, January.
    7. Allen, Franklin & Santomero, Anthony M., 1997. "The theory of financial intermediation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(11-12), pages 1461-1485, December.
    8. Gomes, Armando & Phillips, Gordon, 2012. "Why do public firms issue private and public securities?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 619-658.
    9. Evelyn Hayden & Daniel Porath & Natalja Westernhagen, 2007. "Does Diversification Improve the Performance of German Banks? Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 32(3), pages 123-140, December.
    10. Zsolt Becsi & Victor E. Li & Ping Wang, 2000. "Financial matchmakers in credit markets with heterogeneous borrowers," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2000-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    11. Saunders, Anthony & Acharya, Viral & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2002. "The Effects of Focus and Diversification on Bank Risk and Return: Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios," CEPR Discussion Papers 3252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Andrew Winton, 1996. "Monitored finance, liquidity, and institutional investment choice," Working Papers (Old Series) 9616, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    13. Lacker, Jeffrey & Weinberg, John A, 1993. "A Coalition Proof Equilibrium for a Private Information Credit Economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 279-296, April.
    14. Donald S. Allen & Leonce Ndikumana, 1998. "Financial intermediation and economic growth in southern Africa," Working Papers 1998-004, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    15. Stefania Cosci & Valentina Meliciani, 2006. "Multiple Banking Relationships And Over‐Leverage In Italian Manufacturing Firms," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 74(s1), pages 78-92, September.
    16. Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, "undated". "Bank Capital Regulation in General Equilibrium," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 17-95, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    17. Gianni De Nicolo, 2000. "Size, charter value and risk in banking: an international perspective," International Finance Discussion Papers 689, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    18. Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "Borrower risk and the price and nonprice terms of bank loans," Staff Reports 90, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    19. Peter R. Hartley & Carl E. Walsh, 1988. "Financial intermediation, monetary policy, and equilibrium business cycles," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Fall, pages 19-28.
    20. Benlu Hai & Ximing Yin & Jie Xiong & Jin Chen, 2022. "Could more innovation output bring better financial performance? The role of financial constraints," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 8(1), pages 1-26, December.
    21. Raimundo Soto, "undated". "Nonlinearities in the Demand for money: A Neural Network Approach," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv107, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    22. Luma Al-Qudah & Barbara Piontek & Judit Olah, 2021. "Economic Growth and Foreign Direct Investment in the Context of Financial Development: Evidence from Jordan," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(2B), pages 762-782.
    23. John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The adverse selection approach to financial intermediation: some characteristics of the equilibrium financial structure," Working Paper 95-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    24. Andrew Winton, 1999. "Don’t Put All Your Eggs in One Basket? Diversification and Specialization in Lending," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-16, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stephen D. Williamson, 1987. "Recent developments in modeling financial intermediation," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 11(Sum), pages 19-29.
    2. Jeffrey Lacker, 2001. "Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 4(4), pages 842-859, October.
    3. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 2000. "Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-34, January.
    4. Bougheas, Spiros, 2007. "Imperfect capital markets, income distribution and the choice of external finance: A financial equilibrium approach," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 507-520, September.
    5. Charles T. Carlstrom & Katherine A. Samolyk, 1993. "Examining the microfoundations of market incentives for asset-backed lending," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 29(Q I), pages 27-38.
    6. Mervyn K. Lewis, 1992. "Modern Banking in Theory and Practice," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(2), pages 203-228.
    7. Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & Bruce Smith, 2001. "Socially excessive bankruptcy costs and the benefits of interest rate ceilings on loans," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2001-27, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    8. Beck, Thorsten & Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Merrouche, Ouarda, 2013. "Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model, efficiency and stability," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 433-447.
    9. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2015. "Cash-flow business taxation revisited: bankruptcy, risk aversion and asymmetric information," Working Papers 1531, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    10. Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    11. Yongfu Huang, 2011. "Private investment and financial development in a globalized world," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 43-56, August.
    12. Larsson, Bo & Wijkander, Hans, 2015. "Dynamic Banking with Endogenous Risk Based Funding Cost: Value Maximization, Risk-taking, Responses to Regulation and Credit Contraction," Research Papers in Economics 2015:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    13. Zhixiong Zeng, 2013. "A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(2), pages 729-754, March.
    14. Giuseppe Coco & David De Meza, 2009. "In Defense of Usury Laws," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(8), pages 1691-1703, December.
    15. Daibi W. Dagogo & Tamunonimim A. Ngerebo-a, 2018. "Bank Fraud and Financial Intermediation: A Supply-side Causality Analysis," Athens Journal of Business & Economics, Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER), vol. 4(1), pages 83-96, January.
    16. Rousseau, Peter L., 1998. "The permanent effects of innovation on financial depth:: Theory and US historical evidence from unobservable components models," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 387-425, July.
    17. Ross Levine, 1990. "Stock markets, growth, and policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 374, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    18. Boot, Arnoud & Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1987. "Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 449-471, September.
    19. James B. Ang, 2008. "A Survey Of Recent Developments In The Literature Of Finance And Growth," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 536-576, July.
    20. Bénédicte Coestier & Nathalie Fombaron, 2003. "L'audit en assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2003-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:87. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kate Hansel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cfrbmus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.