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The mortgage crisis: let markets work, but compensate the truly needy

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  • William R. Emmons

Abstract

As painful as it may be, letting the housing and mortgage markets sort out these problems on their own would be best for the economy in the long run. Large-scale government interventions are not necessarily the best policy responses, although those made truly needy by this crisis need to be helped.

Suggested Citation

  • William R. Emmons, 2008. "The mortgage crisis: let markets work, but compensate the truly needy," The Regional Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 10-16.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlre:y:2008:i:jul:p:10-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, 2008. "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis," NBER Working Papers 13936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Kristopher Gerardi & Adam Hale Shapiro & Paul S. Willen, 2007. "Subprime outcomes: risky mortgages, homeownership experiences, and foreclosures," Working Papers 07-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    3. David C. Wheelock, 2006. "What happens to banks when house prices fall? U.S. regional housing busts of the 1980s and 1990s," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 88(Sep), pages 413-430.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kenc, Turalay & Dibooglu, Sel, 2010. "The 2007-2009 financial crisis, global imbalances and capital flows: Implications for reform," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 3-21, March.

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    Keywords

    Mortgages; Financial crises;

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