Determinantes do lance vencedor em leilões de petróleo e gás: Avaliando o caso brasileiro
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Cited by:
- Matoso, Rafael & Rezende, Marcelo, 2014. "Asymmetric information in oil and gas lease auctions with a national company," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 72-82.
- Rafael Henrique Mainardes Ferreira & Claudia Tania Picinin, 2018. "Bibliometric analysis for characterization of oil production in Brazilian territory," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 116(3), pages 1945-1974, September.
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