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Determinantes do lance vencedor em leilões de petróleo e gás: Avaliando o caso brasileiro

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  • Moura, Rodrigo Leandro
  • Canêdo-Pinheiro, Maurício
  • Daitx, Fernando

Abstract

This paper follows Rezende (2008) to investigate the determinants of bidding strategy in the Brazilian oil and gas auctions. The results indicate that strategies adopted by participants are affected by the “winner’s curse”. We also found evidence that the presence of Petrobras has a positive effect on winning bids. Furthermore, joint bidding is compatible with competition. Finally, there is no evidence of synergies between blocks. Thus, although there is room for improvements, results of the first-price sealed auction (without the possibility of bidding for blocks packages) are not much better than possible alternatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Moura, Rodrigo Leandro & Canêdo-Pinheiro, Maurício & Daitx, Fernando, 2012. "Determinantes do lance vencedor em leilões de petróleo e gás: Avaliando o caso brasileiro," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 66(4), December.
    • Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:66:y:2012:i:4:a:3746
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Leonardo Rezende, 2008. "Econometrics of auctions by least squares," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 925-948.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Rafael Henrique Mainardes Ferreira & Claudia Tania Picinin, 2018. "Bibliometric analysis for characterization of oil production in Brazilian territory," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 116(3), pages 1945-1974, September.

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