Who Gains More Power in the EU after Brexit?
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- Szczypinska, Agnieszka, 2017. "Who gains more power in the EU after Brexit?," MF Working Papers 27, Ministry of Finance in Poland.
References listed on IDEAS
- Turnovec, Frantisek, 1997. "The Double Majority Principle and Decision Making Games in Extending European Union," East European Series 48, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
- Dennis Leech, 2002.
"An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices,"
Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 50(1), pages 1-22, March.
- Leech, D., 2000. "An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 563, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Kóczy, László Á., 2012. "Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 152-158.
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More about this item
Keywords
Brexit; power index; voting power; Council of the European Union; demographics;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
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