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Stackelberg Assumption vs. Nash Assumption in Partially Cooperative Games

Author

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  • Lina Mallozzi

    (University of Naples Federico II, Department of Mathematics and Applications, Naples, Italy)

  • Stef Tijs

    (University of Tilburg, CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg, The Netherlands)

Abstract

We deal with n-person normal form games where a subset of players decide to cooperate (signatories) and choose strategies by maximizing the aggregate welfare of the coalition members as in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) context. The non-cooperating (non-signatories) players choose their strategies as a Nash equilibrium. In this paper the partial cooperative equilibrium (PCE) under the Nash-Cournot and the Stackelberg assumptions are considered and presented also in the case of non-signatories multiple decision. Some properties are discussed in both situations, particularly the profit of the players are compared.

Suggested Citation

  • Lina Mallozzi & Stef Tijs, 2012. "Stackelberg Assumption vs. Nash Assumption in Partially Cooperative Games," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 5-13, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2012_005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hanif D. Sherali & Allen L. Soyster & Frederic H. Murphy, 1983. "Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 253-276, April.
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    3. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
    4. Elena Denisova & Andrey Garnaev, 2008. "Fish Wars: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Approaches," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 028-040, March.
    5. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert Gilles & Emiliya Lazarova, 2011. "Strategic behavior under partial cooperation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 175-193, August.
    6. Lina Mallozzi & Stef Tijs, 2009. "Coordinating choice in partial cooperative equilibrium," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 1459-1465.
    7. Amir, Rabah & Grilo, Isabel, 1999. "Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January.
    8. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1992. "The international dimension of environmental policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 379-387, April.
    9. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert P. Gilles & Lina Mallozzi & Roberta Messalli, 2023. "Emergent Collaboration in Social Purpose Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 566-588, June.
    2. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert P. Gilles & Emiliya Lazarova, 2018. "Partial cooperation in strategic multi-sided decision situations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 455-478, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Partial cooperation; Stackelberg assumption; Nash-Cournot assumption; Stackelberg leader’s value;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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