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Market Failures and Multi-layered Collective Action. US Economic Debates

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  • Fabio Masini
  • Albertina Nania

Abstract

The paper reconstructs the debates in the USA about economic theorizing and policymaking advisory concerning a multi-layered system of governments. Beyond apparent similarities, it highlights the ontological divides between Ostrom-Tiebout- Warren on polycentric governance and Buchanan on competitive federalism on the one side, and Musgrave?s and Olson?s fiscal federalism. It further underlines how such divides - concerning the relative role of individuals, markets, collective author- ities, and social order - echoed similar debates in Europe related to a multi-layered economic system, again depending mostly on different ontological assumptions.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabio Masini & Albertina Nania, 2023. "Market Failures and Multi-layered Collective Action. US Economic Debates," HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2023(1), pages 69-89.
    • Handle: RePEc:fan:spespe:v:html10.3280/spe2023-001003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Olson, Mancur, Jr, 1969. "The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence": The Division of Responsibilities among Different Levels of Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 479-487, May.
    6. Boettke, Peter J. & Coyne, Christopher J., 2005. "Methodological individualism, spontaneous order and the research program of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 145-158, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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