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Effective marginal and average tax rates in the 2017 Italian tax-benefit system

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  • Fernando Di Nicola
  • Melisso Boschi
  • Giorgio Mongelli

Abstract

The personal income tax-benefit system influences, through marginal and average tax rates, income redistribution, labour supply, and tax evasion. In this paper we present, for the main taxpayer types and income levels, the statutory and implicit tax rates generated by the Italian personal income tax-benefit system components (social contributions, personal income tax, income type deductions, family-related deductions, family allowance, local surtaxes, and the "80 euro monthly bonus") along with the effective marginal tax rates deriving from their interaction. These tax rates are computed both for hypothetical taxpayer types (employee, retiree, self-employed with and without dependent family members) and using a microsimulation model based on a representative sample. The results show that the Italian tax-benefit system generates a broad range of effective marginal tax rates, with positive and negative values, determining, in some cases, also "poverty traps" (that is marginal tax rates higher than 100 percent). The marginal and average tax rates are also sometimes decreasing with growing taxable income, while at a low level of income we have such high tax rates that a disincentive for labour supply may result. With this evidence, a correction of the Italian tax-benefit system appears desirable both to preserve a more efficient income redistribution as well as labour supply incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernando Di Nicola & Melisso Boschi & Giorgio Mongelli, 2017. "Effective marginal and average tax rates in the 2017 Italian tax-benefit system," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2017(3), pages 67-90.
  • Handle: RePEc:fan:epepep:v:html10.3280/ep2017-003003
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    Cited by:

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    2. Francesca Carta & Marta De Philippis, 2021. "Working horizon and labour supply: the effect of raising the full retirement age on middle-aged individuals," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1314, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    3. La Torre, Davide & Liuzzi, Danilo & Marsiglio, Simone, 2021. "Epidemics and macroeconomic outcomes: Social distancing intensity and duration," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    4. Ali Bayar & Barbara Bratta & Silvia Carta & Paolo Di Caro & Marco Manzo & Carlo Orecchia, 2021. "Assessing the effects of VAT policies with an integrated CGE-microsimulation approach: evidence on Italy," Working Papers wp2021-14, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Department of Finance.
    5. Dalila De Rosa & Gloria Di Caprera & Francesco Figari & Carlo Fiorio & Pasquale Giacobbe & Marco Manzo & Elena Miola & Giorgio Mongelli & Chiara Subrizi, 2023. "L’Assegno Unico e Universale e la revisione dell’IRPEF nel 2022: un’analisi di equità ed efficienza per famiglie di lavoratori dipendenti," Working Papers wp2023-19, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Department of Finance.
    6. Paolo Di Caro, 2018. "Redistribution in real-world PIT: Evidence from Italian tax records," Working Papers wp2018-2, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Department of Finance.
    7. Paolo Di Caro, 2017. "The contribution of tax statistics for analysing regional income disparities in Italy," Journal of Income Distribution, Ad libros publications inc., vol. 25(1), pages 1-27, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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