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L?attribuzione della vigilanza bancaria alla BCE: un approccio di political economy

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  • Elena Seghezza

Abstract

All?atto della sua costituzione alla BCE non fu concessa, accanto alla funzione monetaria, la responsabilit? della vigilanza bancaria. La crisi finanziaria del 2008-2009 e quella del debito sovrano del 2010-2011 hanno indotto policymakers e economisti a riconsiderare la questione. In questo contributo si ripercorre il processo attraverso cui si ? pervenuti ad attribuire le funzioni di vigilanza alla BCE. Tale processo ? presentato come l?esito di un negoziato tra diversi attori politici. Nel loro interagire questi attori possono dar luogo ad alleanze e coalizioni. Come gli altri attori politici anche le istituzioni internazionali vivono di fasi in cui il loro potere aumenta e fasi in cui il loro potere diminuisce. In occasione delle recenti crisi finanziarie la BCE ha svolto un ruolo cruciale per la preservazione dell?integrit? dell?Eurozona. A seguito di ci? la sua influenza politica ? sensibilmente aumentata. Sfruttando anche questo fattore la BCE ha potuto estendere il suo potere acquisendo la responsabilit? della vigilanza sulle banche dell?Eurozona.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Seghezza, 2016. "L?attribuzione della vigilanza bancaria alla BCE: un approccio di political economy," ECONOMIA E DIRITTO DEL TERZIARIO, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2016(3), pages 423-438.
    • Handle: RePEc:fan:ededed:v:html10.3280/ed2016-003005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    BCE; vigilanza bancaria; attori politici; political economy.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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