IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ers/journl/vxxivy2021i3bp456-469.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sanctions as a Mechanism Disciplining Issuers on the NewConnect Market

Author

Listed:
  • Sylwia Frydrych

Abstract

Purpose: This article aims to analyze the types of disciplinary measures imposed by the WSE, as the ATS Organizer, on NewConnect companies in 2008-2020 for violation of applicable law. The analysis covers the types of disciplinary measures depending on the breach of the ATS Regulations by issuers. Design/Methodology/Approach: Due to the complexity of the data analysis, mixed research methods were used as observation, analysis, and inference. The study used reports available at www.newconnect.pl and statistical data from the Annals of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Findings: In the analyzed period, 57.42% of NewConnect companies were subject to sanctions. The most common disciplinary measures imposed on companies for non-compliance with the ASO Regulations are suspension, warning, and a fine. A financial penalty has a more disciplinary effect on NewConnect companies than other punitive measures. Practical implications: The conclusions of this study can be used in the sanctioning process of the ATS Organizer. The article's content concerns the findings of the analysis of the most common violations of the ATS Regulations by issuers and the answer to whether the penalty imposed by the ATS Organizer disciplines issuers, contributing to better fulfillment of the obligations arising from the ATS Regulations. Originality/Value: The theoretical and empirical literature does not provide guidance on factors that discipline issuers, contribute to compliance with regulations, and avoid excluding a company from the NewConnect market. The analysis results presented in the article supplement the existing research on sanctions imposed on companies listed on NewConnect in 2008-2020 due to the type of violation.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylwia Frydrych, 2021. "Sanctions as a Mechanism Disciplining Issuers on the NewConnect Market," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(3B), pages 456-469.
    • Handle: RePEc:ers:journl:v:xxiv:y:2021:i:3b:p:456-469
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ersj.eu/journal/2475/download
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Corinne Bessieux-Ollier & Élisabeth Walliser, 2012. "Why firms listed on an unregulated financial market comply voluntarily with IFRS: An empirical analysis with French data," Post-Print hal-00690935, HAL.
    2. Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December.
    3. Mark Lang & Karl V. Lins & Mark Maffett, 2012. "Transparency, Liquidity, and Valuation: International Evidence on When Transparency Matters Most," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 729-774, June.
    4. Corinne Bessieux-Ollier & Élisabeth Walliser, 2012. "Why firms listed on an unregulated financial market comply voluntarily with IFRS: an empirical analysis with French data," Post-Print halshs-03553467, HAL.
    5. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, February.
    6. Armour, John & Mayer, Colin & Polo, Andrea, 2017. "Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 1429-1448, August.
    7. Gao, Xiaohui & Ritter, Jay R. & Zhu, Zhongyan, 2013. "Where Have All the IPOs Gone?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(6), pages 1663-1692, December.
    8. Christian Leuz & Peter D. Wysocki, 2016. "The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 525-622, May.
    9. Laure Batz, 2020. "Financial impact of regulatory sanctions on listed companies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 301-337, April.
    10. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Lee, D. Scott & Martin, Gerald S., 2008. "The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 581-611, September.
    11. Corinne Bessieux-Ollier & Élisabeth Walliser, 2012. "Why firms listed on an unregulated financial market comply voluntarily with IFRS: an empirical analysis with French data," Post-Print halshs-03553481, HAL.
    12. Andy Lardon & Marc Deloof, 2014. "Financial disclosure by SMEs listed on a semi-regulated market: evidence from the Euronext Free Market," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 361-385, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andy Lardon & Marc Deloof, 2014. "Financial disclosure by SMEs listed on a semi-regulated market: evidence from the Euronext Free Market," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 361-385, February.
    2. Mazzi, Francesco & Slack, Richard & Tsalavoutas, Ioannis, 2018. "The effect of corruption and culture on mandatory disclosure compliance levels: Goodwill reporting in Europe," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 52-73.
    3. Licht, Amir N. & Poliquin, Christopher & Siegel, Jordan I. & Li, Xi, 2018. "What makes the bonding stick? A natural experiment testing the legal bonding hypothesis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(2), pages 329-356.
    4. Laure Batz, 2023. "Financial market enforcement in France," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 409-468, June.
    5. Aghanya, Daniel & Agarwal, Vineet & Poshakwale, Sunil, 2020. "Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), stock price informativeness and liquidity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    6. Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2018. "The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A View from Accounting Research," CEPR Discussion Papers 12775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Rita Rodríguez‐Arrojo & Manuel Luna & Camilo J. Vázquez‐Ordás & Myriam García‐Olalla, 2024. "Mapping research on corporate misconduct in banking: Lessons from literature on preventive and punitive actions," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 15(S1), pages 62-75, March.
    8. Dan Amiram & Zahn Bozanic & James D. Cox & Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff & Richard Sloan, 2018. "Financial reporting fraud and other forms of misconduct: a multidisciplinary review of the literature," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 732-783, June.
    9. Laure, de Batz, 2020. "Financial crime spillovers. Does one gain to be avenged?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 196-215.
    10. Susan Chaplinsky & Kathleen Weiss Hanley & S. Katie Moon, 2017. "The JOBS Act and the Costs of Going Public," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 795-836, September.
    11. Gordon, Elizabeth A. & Hsu, Hsiao-Tang & Huang, Huichi, 2020. "Peer R&D disclosure and corporate innovation: Evidence from American depositary receipt firms," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    12. Hail, Luzi & Leuz, Christian, 2009. "Cost of capital effects and changes in growth expectations around U.S. cross-listings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 428-454, September.
    13. Huang, Robin Hui & Zhang, Linhan, 2023. "The effects of reputational sanctions on culpable firms: Evidence from China’s stock markets," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    14. Xu, Wenming & Xu, Guangdong, 2020. "Understanding public enforcement of securities law in China: An empirical analysis of the enforcement actions of the CSRC and its regional offices against informational misconduct," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    15. Marc Badia & Miguel Duro & Bjorn N. Jorgensen & Gaizka Ormazabal & Hans B. Christensen, 2020. "The Informational Effects of Tightening Oil and Gas Disclosure Rules," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 1720-1755, September.
    16. Laure Batz, 2020. "Financial impact of regulatory sanctions on listed companies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 301-337, April.
    17. Divakaruni, Anantha & Jones, Howard, 2021. "Disclosure, Firm Growth, and the JOBS Act," SocArXiv 3zumb, Center for Open Science.
    18. Ying Cao & Linda A. Myers & Albert Tsang & Yong George Yang, 2017. "Management forecasts and the cost of equity capital: international evidence," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 791-838, June.
    19. Xi Li & Amir N. Licht & Christopher Poliquin & Jordan I. Siegel, 2015. "What Makes the Bonding Stick? A Natural Experiment Involving the U.S. Supreme Court and Cross-Listed Firms," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2015-19, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Mar 2015.
    20. Christian Leuz & Peter D. Wysocki, 2016. "The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 525-622, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sanctions; Alternative Trading System; NewConnect.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ers:journl:v:xxiv:y:2021:i:3b:p:456-469. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marios Agiomavritis (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://ersj.eu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.