IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/erp/eiopxx/p0081.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reforming the European Commission A (missed?) Academic Opportunity

Author

Listed:
  • Bauer, Michael W.

Abstract

The desire to reform the European Commission is a recurrent theme on the agenda. Has the political failure to reach an appropriate restructuring of this institution a parallel in academic neglect of that institution? To answer this question the article looks into current research efforts on the reform of the European Commission. It calls for (more) systematic investigation into the Commission's managerial strengths and weaknesses and does plead for a reassessment of the Commission's potential in the context of the ongoing governance changes.

Suggested Citation

  • Bauer, Michael W., 2002. "Reforming the European Commission A (missed?) Academic Opportunity," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 6, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:erp:eiopxx:p0081
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-008a.htm
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-008.htm
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2002-008.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Giandomenico Majone, 2001. "Two Logics of Delegation," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 103-122, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:47:y:2009:i::p:483-506 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Bartle, Ian & Vass, Peter, 2007. "Independent economic regulation: A reassessment of its role in sustainable development," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 261-269, December.
    3. Seikel, Daniel, 2011. "Wie die Europäische Kommission Liberalisierung durchsetzt: Der Konflikt um das öffentlich-rechtliche Bankenwesen in Deutschland," MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/16, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    4. Eckert, Sandra, 2020. "EU agencies in banking and energy between institutional and policy centralisation," SAFE Working Paper Series 278, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    5. Sjef Ederveen & George Gelauff & Jacques Pelkmans, 2008. "Assessing Subsidiarity," Springer Books, in: George Gelauff & Isabel Grilo & Arjan Lejour (ed.), Subsidiarity and Economic Reform in Europe, chapter 2, pages 19-40, Springer.
    6. Nazli Aziz, 2005. "Power delegation and the European Central Bank's democratic deficit," Asia Europe Journal, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 537-550, December.
    7. Sarel, Roee & Demirtas, Melanie, 2021. "Delegation in a multi-tier court system: Are remands in the U.S. federal courts driven by moral hazard?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    8. Christine Neuhold & Andreea Năstase, 2017. "Transparency Watchdog: Guarding the Law and Independent from Politics? The Relationship between the European Ombudsman and the European Parliament," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 5(3), pages 40-50.
    9. Trym N. Fjørtoft, 2022. "More power, more control: The legitimizing role of expertise in Frontex after the refugee crisis," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(2), pages 557-571, April.
    10. Clément Fontan & David Howarth, 2021. "The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(2), pages 241-251.
    11. Giuseppe Zaccaria, 2022. "You’re Fired! International Courts, Re‐contracting, and the WTO Appellate Body during the Trump Presidency," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 13(3), pages 322-333, June.
    12. Yaning Zhang, 2022. "Limits of Law in the Multilevel System: Explaining the European Commission's Toleration of Noncompliance Concerning Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 1001-1018, July.
    13. Paul Schure & Amy Verdun, 2008. "Legislative Bargaining in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(4), pages 459-486, December.
    14. Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, 2006. "The Independence of International Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(2), pages 253-275, April.
    15. Mattia Guidi, 2015. "The Impact of Independence on Regulatory Outcomes: the Case of EU Competition Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(6), pages 1195-1213, November.
    16. Budzinski, Oliver & Eckert, Sandra, 2015. "Wettbewerb und Regulierung," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 93, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    17. Hayo, Bernd & Voigt, Stefan, 2007. "Explaining de facto judicial independence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 269-290, September.
    18. Charlotte Burns & Paul Tobin, 2020. "Crisis, Climate Change and Comitology: Policy Dismantling Via the Backdoor?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 527-544, May.
    19. Eric Brousseau & Yves Schemeil & Jérôme Sgard, 2011. "Constitutional Rights; Economic dynamics; Vertical bargaining; state; global reordering; Legal order; public bureaucracies," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/28, European University Institute.
    20. Abbott, Kenneth W. & Genschel, Philipp & Snidal, Duncan & Zangl, Bernhard, 2018. "The governor's dilemma: Competence versus control in indirect governance," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2018-101, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    21. Luis E. Mejía, 2021. "Judicial review of regulatory decisions: Decoding the contents of appeals against agencies in Spain and the United Kingdom," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 760-784, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:erp:eiopxx:p0081. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Editorial Assistant (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecsaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.