Quantal response equilibria for posted offer-markets
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Cited by:
- Oswaldo Gressani, 2015. "Endogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium for Normal Form Games," DEM Discussion Paper Series 15-18, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
- Blavatskyy, Pavlo, 2018. "Oligopolistic price competition with a continuous demand," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 123-131.
- Ralph-C. Bayer & Hang Wu & Mickey Chan, 2014. "Special Section: Experiments on Learning, Methods, and Voting," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 278-295, August.
- Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2004.
"Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and Evidence,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 448-466, Autumn.
- Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2004. "Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 2004-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Uri Gneezy & Jacob Goeree & Rosemarie Nagel, 2007.
"Price floors and competition,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 211-224, October.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri & Goeree, Jacob K. & Nagel, Rosemarie, 2002. "Price Floors and Competition," Research Papers in Economics 2002:13, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Gressani, O., 2015. "Endogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium for Normal Form Games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2015053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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