Bounded self‐interest: a basis for constructive organizational politics

Purpose - The aim of this paper is to critically explore the behavioral assumptions of organizational politics, as well as to reconsider and redefine the premises of political behavior in the workplace. The main objective is examination of the presuppositions associated with the possibility of constructive politics in organizational settings. Design/methodology/approach - The deficiencies of explaining managerial activity as solely regulated by self‐interest are discussed, as well as a revised version of self‐interest that may enrich current understanding of workplace politics. Drawing on the respective literature, the authors develop some propositions and suggest, assess and discuss a conceptual framework that integrates self‐interest and constructive politics. Findings - The paper represents an attempt toward inferring positive political behavior through adopting an alternative view of established behavioral assumptions. This view purports to reduce the existing discrepancy between different types of political behavior in defending the possibility of an inclusive, participative and welfare‐enhancing political process, founded on the pro‐social and reciprocating aspects of human interaction. Boundedly selfish organizational members are expected to demonstrate these qualities that are in position to transform the very nature of political activities to the direction of greater organizational good. Originality/value - The paper reevaluates the self‐interested nature of organizational politics through the introduction of a bounded self‐interest assumption as more representative of actual human behavior. This new construct embodies those constraints that make trust formation, networking and reciprocities operative in environments effectively embedding political behavior in broader, organizational goal‐oriented processes and structures.