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Consumer default and optimal consumption decisions

Author

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  • Alexandros P. Bechlioulis
  • Sophocles N. Brissimis

Abstract

Purpose - The authors examine the optimal consumption decisions of households in a micro-founded framework that introduces endogenous default. They study default in the context of a two-period process, assuming three non-overlapping steps of non-payment: delinquency, non-performing loans and bankruptcy (default). Design/methodology/approach - In their model, the authors extend the analysis of loan default to two periods and include agent heterogeneity by considering also saving households. In the optimization problem, the authors obtain first-order conditions for borrowers who do not repay all of their loans (comparing them to those who fully repay them) and also for savers. In addition, by using nonlinear Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), they obtain consistent estimates of the household preference parameters and present the impulse responses of borrowers' consumption to demand shocks. Findings - The authors derive an augmented consumption Euler equation for borrowers, which is a functioninter aliaof an expected default factor. They estimate this equation and find non-negligible differences in preference parameters relative to values reported in the literature. Further, an ordering by size of the household discount factors is provided empirically. Finally, the impulse responses of borrowers' consumption to a demand shock are found to last more for borrowers who do not fully repay their debts. Originality/value - This work represents a promising line of research by introducing default in one of the basic components of DSGE models, making the latter more appropriate for analyzing monetary and macro-prudential policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexandros P. Bechlioulis & Sophocles N. Brissimis, 2020. "Consumer default and optimal consumption decisions," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 48(5), pages 1020-1034, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:jespps:jes-06-2020-0268
    DOI: 10.1108/JES-06-2020-0268
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    1. Alexandros P. Bechlioulis & Sophocles N. Brissimis, 2021. "Are household consumption decisions affected by past due unsecured debt? Theory and evidence," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(2), pages 3040-3053, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Borrowing household; Saving household; Household behavior; Consumer default; Optimal consumption; C61; D11; E21;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth

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