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The determinants of board meetings: evidence from categorical analysis

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  • Basil Al‐Najjar

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the frequency of board meetings as an index for board activity including their monitoring role. Design/methodology/approach - The research sample is composed of 120 UK firms based on their market capitalization for the period from 2003 to 2008. The study applies multinomial logistic modelling and conditional logistic modelling to investigate the frequency of board meetings. Findings - The study finds that board size and structure are positively related to the frequency of board meetings. In addition, a negative impact of audit committee diligence on the frequency board meetings is reported. The study finds no evidence that the frequency of board meetings are reduced when there is a CEO duality. Finally, the results show that firm size, leverage, free cash flows, and Tobin'sQhave an impact on the frequency of board meetings. Practical implications - This study shows the factors that affect the board effectiveness in the UK, namely that board meetings, board composition, and board size, are key indicators for good internal governance practices and, in turn, enhance board monitoring activities. Originality/value - The research offers the first major study to examine the determinants of the frequency of board meetings in UK non‐financial firms. The paucity of the UK literature regarding board effectiveness in the UK reinforces the empirical importance of the results for researchers, managers, and UK policy makers.

Suggested Citation

  • Basil Al‐Najjar, 2012. "The determinants of board meetings: evidence from categorical analysis," Journal of Applied Accounting Research, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 13(2), pages 178-190, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:jaarpp:v:13:y:2012:i:2:p:178-190
    DOI: 10.1108/09675421211254867
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Muhammad Hassan & Muhammad Rizwan, 2016. "Corporate Governance Under Multi- Theoretical Perspective," IBT Journal of Business Studies (JBS), Ilma University, Faculty of Management Science, vol. 12(2), pages 68-86.
    3. S. Baccouche & M. Hadriche & A. Omri, 2014. "Multiple directorships and board meeting frequency: evidence from France," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(14), pages 983-992, July.
    4. Santiago Lago-Peñas & Elena Rivo-López & Mónica Villanueva-Villar, 2016. "On the relationship between corporate governance and value creation in an economic crisis: Empirical evidence for the Spanish case," Working Papers. Collection C: Family business 1602, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
    5. Irfan Raza & Fouzia Tariq, 2016. "Effect Of Hr Diversity Management Practices On Employee Knowledge Sharing: Examining The Mediating Role Of Trust On Leadership And Moderating Role Of Cooperative Norms," IBT Journal of Business Studies (JBS), Ilma University, Faculty of Management Science, vol. 12(2), pages 12-11.

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