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Social value orientation and regulatory compliance in Ugandan public procurement

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph Mpeera Ntayi
  • Pascal Ngoboka
  • Henry Mutebi
  • Gidah Sitenda

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the perceptions and effects of social value orientation, expected utility, fairness in procurement procedures, the legitimacy of the procurement law and the procurement law enforcement authority on compliance with the procurement law, guidelines, procedures and regulations. Empirical research in this area is relatively sparse. Design/methodology/approach - Data were collected from a sample of 110 Procurement and Disposing Entities (PDEs) and analysed using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modelling (SEM). Findings - Results of the fit indices between the model and the observed data were generally good for both CFA and SEM. Results reveal that social value orientation, expected utility, legitimacy of the procurement law enforcement agency and perceptions of procedural justice were significant predictors of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (PPDA) regulatory agency. Research limitations/implications - This study however has several limitations which limit the interpretation of results. First, the data are cross sectional, thus limiting monitoring changes in behaviour over time. Second, all item scales adapted in this study were not specifically developed for a public procurement regulatory environment. This means that there is need to develop specific item scales for public procurement regulatory environments. Practical implications - The paper shows that the PPDA regulatory framework should revise its compliance instrument to consider social value orientation. Originality/value - This paper uses constructs of social value orientation, which are largely ignored in legislated professions to predict compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Mpeera Ntayi & Pascal Ngoboka & Henry Mutebi & Gidah Sitenda, 2012. "Social value orientation and regulatory compliance in Ugandan public procurement," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 39(11), pages 900-920, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:ijsepp:v:39:y:2012:i:11:p:900-920
    DOI: 10.1108/03068291211263925
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pablo Yanguas, 2017. "Varieties of state-building in Africa: Elites, ideas and the politics of public sector reform," Global Development Institute Working Paper Series esid-089-17, GDI, The University of Manchester.
    2. Ssekalema Abdulhasib & Ssendagi Muhamad, 2022. "The Influence of Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority Advisory Role on Corruption in Kabale Municipal Council, Uganda," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 6(9), pages 121-127, September.

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