Encouraging pharmaceutical innovation to meet the needs of both developed and developing countries
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DOI: 10.1108/14468951111123346
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References listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
Pharmaceutical products; Pricing; Patents; Ethics; Developing countries;All these keywords.
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