IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v169y2023ics0305750x23000505.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Dismantling old or forging new clientelistic ties? Sudan’s civil service reform after uprising

Author

Listed:
  • Hassan, Mai
  • Kodouda, Ahmed

Abstract

Civil service reform is often a top priority for popular movements that unseat autocracy, and during democratization campaigns more broadly: when a deposed regime had relied upon a clientelistic state to stay in power, in which bureaucrats were rewarded for using their authority to further the interests of the regime and its top elites, new political elites have strong incentives to undertake changes to the state and its personnel upon taking over. Yet despite initially-aligned politician incentives for civil service reform in post-uprising contexts, we highlight how bureaucratic actions can serve as a causal antecedent to new politicians’ subsequent stymieing of reform. Bureaucrats can leverage their embedded knowledge of state processes to forge clientelistic ties with new political elites. This in turn prompts politicians to use their power to block attempts to create more rational-legal agencies. We trace these dynamics through in-depth qualitative and ethnographic data of (failed) efforts to reform Sudan’s civil service after the 2018–19 popular uprising which unseated a 30-year autocracy. Overall, this paper helps explain why so many recent popular uprisings that have come to power have been unable to deliver the large-scale transformative reform upon which they were launched by focusing attention on the elements of the former autocracy that survived the transition.

Suggested Citation

  • Hassan, Mai & Kodouda, Ahmed, 2023. "Dismantling old or forging new clientelistic ties? Sudan’s civil service reform after uprising," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:169:y:2023:i:c:s0305750x23000505
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106232
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X23000505
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106232?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cesi Cruz & Philip Keefer, 2015. "Political Parties, Clientelism, and Bureaucratic Reform," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 89657, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Andrews, Matt & Pritchett, Lant & Woolcock, Michael, 2013. "Escaping Capability Traps Through Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 234-244.
    3. Beissinger, Mark R., 2013. "The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine's Orange Revolution," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 574-592, August.
    4. Laura Mann, 2014. "Wasta! The long-term implications of education expansion and economic liberalisation on politics in Sudan," Review of African Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(142), pages 561-578, October.
    5. Emanuele Colonnelli & Mounu Prem & Edoardo Teso, 2020. "Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(10), pages 3071-3099, October.
    6. James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2013. "The Political Economy of Clientelism," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(2), pages 260-291, April.
    7. Cruz, Cesi & Keefer, Philip, 2015. "Political Parties, Clientelism, and Bureaucratic Reform," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6968, Inter-American Development Bank.
    8. Martin Shefter, 1977. "Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy," Politics & Society, , vol. 7(4), pages 403-451, December.
    9. Ward Berenschot, 2018. "Incumbent bureaucrats: Why elections undermine civil service reform in Indonesia," Public Administration & Development, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(4), pages 135-143, October.
    10. Pierskalla, Jan H & Sacks, Audrey, 2020. "Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 1283-1305, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. De La O, Ana L., 2024. "How clientelism undermines state capacity: Evidence from Mexican municipalities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    2. Terence Wood, 2018. "The clientelism trap in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, and its impact on aid policy," Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 481-494, September.
    3. Leopoldo Fergusson & Horacio Larreguy & Juan Felipe Riaño, 2022. "Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(648), pages 2815-2834.
    4. Niño-Zarazúa, Miguel & Santillán Hernández, Alma, 2021. "The political economy of social protection adoption," MPRA Paper 109213, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Terence Wood & Sabit Otor & Matthew Dornan, 2022. "Why are aid projects less effective in the Pacific?," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 40(3), May.
    6. Mir Sadaat Baloch & Nadir Khan, 2022. "Improving the Public Sector Development Programme Allocations in the Clientelistic Environment of Balochistan: A Political Economy Analysis (Article)," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 61(2), pages 213-230.
    7. Adrian Nicholas Gachet, 2022. "Help Me Help You? Populism and Distributive Politics in Ecuador," Economics Discussion Paper Series 2205, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    8. Keefer, Philip & Vlaicu, Razvan, 2017. "Vote buying and campaign promises," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 773-792.
    9. Ann-Sofie Isaksson & Dick Durevall, 2023. "Aid and institutions: Local effects of World Bank aid on perceived institutional quality in Africa," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 523-551, July.
    10. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar, 2020. "The political agenda effect and state centralization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 749-778.
    11. Gallego, J & Prem, M & Vargas, J. F., 2022. "Predicting Politicians Misconduct: Evidence From Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo 20504, Universidad del Rosario.
    12. Francesco Amodio & Giorgio Chiovelli & Sebastian Hohmann, 2024. "The Employment Effects of Ethnic Politics," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 456-491, April.
    13. Wehner,Joachim Hans-Georg & Mills,Linnea Cecilia, 2020. "Cabinet Size and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9232, The World Bank.
    14. Christian Bjørnskov & Stefan Voigt & Mahdi Khesali, 2022. "Unconstitutional States of Emergency," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(2), pages 455-481.
    15. Florian Kiesow Cortez & Jerg Gutmann, 2021. "Domestic Institutions and the Ratification of International Agreements in a Panel of Democracies," International Law and Economics, in: Florian Kiesow Cortez (ed.), The Political Economy of International Agreements, pages 37-62, Springer.
    16. Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 2023. "Militant constitutionalism: a promising concept to make constitutional backsliding less likely?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 377-404, June.
    17. Ardanaz, Martín & Hallerberg, Mark & Scartascini, Carlos, 2020. "Fiscal consolidations and electoral outcomes in emerging economies: Does the policy mix matter? Macro and micro level evidence from Latin America," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    18. Gallego, Jorge & Li, Christopher & Wantchekon, Leonard, 2020. "Electoral Intermediaries," Working papers 45, Red Investigadores de Economía.
    19. Ana L. De La O, 2021. "How clientelism undermines state capacity: Evidence from Mexican municipalities," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2021-169, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    20. Callen, Michael & Gulzar, Saad & Hasanain, Ali & Khan, Muhammad Yasir & Rezaee, Arman, 2023. "The political economy of public sector absence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:169:y:2023:i:c:s0305750x23000505. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.