IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/trapol/v27y2013icp73-84.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Public–private contracting and incentives for public transport: Can anything be learned from the Sydney Metro experience?

Author

Listed:
  • Gordon, Cameron
  • Mulley, Corinne
  • Stevens, Nick
  • Daniels, Rhonda

Abstract

The New South Wales (NSW) government created the Sydney Metro Authority to design, build and operate a completely separate underground Metro rail system to supplement the existing public transport network in Sydney. By the time the NSW government abruptly cancelled the entire Metro project in early 2010, the authority had conceived and designed a contract that was proceeding to procurement. This paper examines the nature of the proposed Sydney Metro contract in relation to its performance framework and compares this to the frameworks in current contracts for bus, rail and ferry public transport in Sydney. Against this background, the paper examines the extent to which the Sydney Metro approach has had an impact on subsequent public transport contracts in the context of the literature on public private contracting and incentives for public transport procurement. The paper concludes that little has been implemented, although the other mode contracts now enable more performance measurement and incentivisation. In particular, the decision to award contracts to existing (and mostly public sector) operators appears to have acted as a brake on developing these performance elements.

Suggested Citation

  • Gordon, Cameron & Mulley, Corinne & Stevens, Nick & Daniels, Rhonda, 2013. "Public–private contracting and incentives for public transport: Can anything be learned from the Sydney Metro experience?," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 73-84.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:trapol:v:27:y:2013:i:c:p:73-84
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2013.01.009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967070X13000127
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.tranpol.2013.01.009?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:3:p:567-91 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    3. repec:bla:ausecr:v:38:y:2005:i:4:p:445-450 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Guðrið Weihe, 2008. "Public-Private Partnerships and Public-Private Value Trade-Offs," Public Money & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 153-158, June.
    5. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    6. Gordon Mills, 1997. "Light Rail in Sydney: Some Privatisation Lessons," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 4(4), pages 433-444.
    7. Hensher, David A. & Stanley, John, 2003. "Performance-based quality contracts in bus service provision," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 519-538, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zhao, Jianfeng & Greenwood, David & Thurairajah, Niraj & Liu, Henry J. & Haigh, Richard, 2022. "Value for money in transport infrastructure investment: An enhanced model for better procurement decisions," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 68-78.
    2. Shrestha, Asheem & Chan, Toong-Khuan & Aibinu, Ajibade A. & Chen, Chuan, 2017. "Efficient risk transfer in PPP wastewater treatment projects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 132-140.
    3. Wretstrand, Anders & Holmberg, Bengt & Berntman, Monica, 2014. "Safety as a key performance indicator: Creating a safety culture for enhanced passenger safety, comfort, and accessibility," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 109-115.
    4. Phil McManus & Graham Haughton, 2021. "Fighting to undo a deal: Identifying and resisting the financialization of the WestConnex motorway, Sydney, Australia," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 53(1), pages 131-149, February.
    5. Ahmadabadi, Ali Akbari & Heravi, Gholamreza, 2019. "The effect of critical success factors on project success in Public-Private Partnership projects: A case study of highway projects in Iran," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 152-161.
    6. Xiao, Zengqi & Lam, Jasmine Siu Lee, 2019. "Willingness to take contractual risk in port public-private partnerships under economic volatility: The role of institutional environment in emerging economies," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 106-116.
    7. Nayan, Ashish & Wang, David Z.W., 2017. "Optimal bus transit route packaging in a privatized contracting regime," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 146-157.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gordon, Cameron & Mulley, Corinne & Stevens, Nick & Daniels, Rhonda, 2013. "How optimal was the Sydney Metro contract?: Comparison with international best practice," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 239-246.
    2. Sang Cheol Lee & Mooweon Rhee & Jongchul Yoon, 2018. "Foreign Monitoring and Audit Quality: Evidence from Korea," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-22, September.
    3. Hoontaek Seo & Sangho Yi & William McCumber, 2024. "Friendly Boards and the Cost of Debt," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 17(7), pages 1-17, July.
    4. Z. Jun Lin & Shengqiang Liu & Fangcheng Sun, 2017. "The Impact of Financing Constraints and Agency Costs on Corporate R&D Investment: Evidence from China," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 17(1), pages 3-42, March.
    5. Ferrell, Allen & Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc, 2016. "Socially responsible firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 585-606.
    6. Tang, Xuesong & Lin, Yan & Peng, Qing & Du, Jun & Chan, Kam C., 2016. "Politically connected directors and firm value: Evidence from forced resignations in China," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 148-167.
    7. Marco Allegrini & Giulio Greco, 2013. "Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(1), pages 187-216, February.
    8. Manhwa Wu & Paoyu Huang & Yensen Ni, 2020. "The Impact of Institutional Shareholdings on Price Limits," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer;Japanese Association of Financial Economics and Engineering, vol. 27(3), pages 343-361, September.
    9. OAlia Gabriela DUTA & Victor Mihăiță DUTA, 2018. "Governance and Moral Risk: New Approaches," Finante - provocarile viitorului (Finance - Challenges of the Future), University of Craiova, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 1(20), pages 85-96, November.
    10. Panagiotis Staikouras & Christos Staikouras & Maria-Eleni Agoraki, 2007. "The effect of board size and composition on European bank performance," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-27, February.
    11. Steen Thomsen & Caspar Rose, 2004. "Foundation Ownership and Financial Performance: Do Companies Need Owners?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 343-364, December.
    12. Cheng, Louis T.W. & Leung, T.Y., 2016. "Government protection, political connection and management turnover in China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 160-176.
    13. Mouna Mrad & Slaheddine Hallara, 2014. "The Relationship Between the Board of Directors and the Performance/Value Creation in a Context of Privatization: The Case of French Companies," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 83-108, March.
    14. Johan Eklund & Johanna Palmberg & Daniel Wiberg, 2013. "Inherited corporate control and returns on investment," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 419-431, August.
    15. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    16. Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "Corporate Governance in Advanced Economies: Lessons in a Post Financial Crash Era.. Introduction to the Special Issue," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 74(4), pages 419-424.
    17. Filatotchev, Igor & Poulsen, Annette & Bell, R. Greg, 2019. "Corporate governance of a multinational enterprise: Firm, industry and institutional perspectives," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-8.
    18. Randy Beavers & Shawn Mobbs, 2020. "Director overconfidence," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 49(2), pages 389-422, June.
    19. Martin Conyon & Annita Florou, 2002. "Top executive dismissal, ownership and corporate performance," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 209-225.
    20. Barbara, Petracci, 2011. "Trading when you cannot trade: Blackout periods in Italian firms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 196-204, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:trapol:v:27:y:2013:i:c:p:73-84. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/30473/description#description .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.