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Cooperation through capacity sharing between competing forwarders

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  • Li, Li
  • Zhang, Rachel Q.

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a shipping system consisting of one carrier and two shipping forwarders who compete on price for businesses from potential shippers. The carrier may quote different prices or a single price to the two shipping forwarders who will then order shipping capacity from the carrier and set the selling prices to the shippers before market uncertainties are revealed. Inspired by cooperation between competing parties in many industries including the maritime shipping industry, we propose a new model under which the shipping forwarders are allowed an opportunity to purchase shipping capacity from each other after they order capacity from the carrier but before they set the selling prices and satisfy demand, referred to as the capacity reservation model. We show analytically that capacity reservation between competing forwarders benefits both the carrier and the forwarders, leading to a win–win situation under various market conditions. Furthermore, capacity reservation can offset the negative effect of a carrier’s pricing power which enables the carrier to charge discriminatory shipping prices to squeeze more profits out of the forwarders.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Li & Zhang, Rachel Q., 2015. "Cooperation through capacity sharing between competing forwarders," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 115-131.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:transe:v:75:y:2015:i:c:p:115-131
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2014.11.003
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